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Introduction

W

hen students entered the chambers of Judge Joseph Meade Bailey
in 1888 for the educational adventure that was later to become
known as Chicago-Kent College of Law, the entire English and
American legal opus fit in 600 volumes. Chatter inside the chambers might
have centered on the infamous “Great Boodle Trial,” one of the first public
corruption trials in Chicago, or the new Rookery Building being built just
a block north on LaSalle Street. More serious discussion might have turned
to basic questions about the Constitution and the highest court of the land.
Should the Bill of Rights be applied to the States? Should everyone have the
right to have their cases heard by the U.S. Supreme Court?
Outside the judge’s chambers, students were faced with a world of new
technologies (the telegram, the portable camera, skyscraping architecture)
and fast-evolving legal questions. Rapid industrialization and the monopolistic tendencies of major enterprises, particularly the railroads centered in
the Midwest, were pushing Congress towards the passage of a path breaking
“anti-trust” law. Women were permitted to enroll in the early law classes held
in Judge Bailey’s chambers and they were increasingly involved in providing
legal aid to the poor through the Protective Agency for Women and Children, but were denied the right to sit on juries. And while Albert Goodwill
Spalding, owner of the Chicago White Stockings, and John Montgomery
Ward, the nation’s most famous shortstop, were battling over player labor
issues, post–Civil War tensions were still simmering in a scandalous case that
pitted California against the President.
Since those early classes in the late nineteenth century, IIT Chicago-Kent
graduates have mastered the law and served their clients in all 50 states and
around the world. They have joined big firms, formed their own firms, created businesses, been appointed to the bench, served as legislators, argued
in the Supreme Court, joined the media, and won awards for their ideas and
their representation. They have changed the law and changed the world. And
now, 125 years after the law school was founded, we celebrate the tenacity
and success of this great Chicago institution and its alumni with tales spanning 125 years of law and change.

Lori Andrews and Sarah Harding
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“The Boodle Aldermen: Each sat in his particular oven,” cartoon by Art Young, 1892.

CHICAGO’S “GREAT BOODLE TRIAL”
Todd Haugh

I

n late-August 1887, as some of
Chicago-Kent College of Law’s
first students were beginning
their studies in the chambers of
Judge Joseph Bailey, a bottle carrying
a handwritten note bobbed across
Lake Michigan. Found on the shores
of Grand Haven, Michigan, the bottle and its contents were rushed to
a reporter for the then-fledgling
Chicago Daily Tribune newspaper.
Thrilled to have scooped the competition, the Tribune published the
note the next day as an exclusive:
To my friends in Chicago: A
few more hours and I will be safe
through the straits and in Canada.

Sheriff Matson, please accept my
thanks for the bath, but I have
concluded it in British waters. Oh
Ed, I wish you were here with me!
Goodbye till we meet!

The note’s author was William
J. McGarigle, and he had reason to
gloat. A former Cook County Commissioner and warden of the Cook
County Hospital, McGarigle had
successfully fled police custody after being convicted on corruption
charges and sentenced to three years
in prison. McGarigle escaped by
duping the Sheriff of Cook County, Canute Matson, into allowing
him a visit with his wife and kids at
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their Lakeview home. After asking
to take a bath to “freshen up,” McGarigle slipped out a window, made
his way to a schooner docked along
the south branch of the Chicago River, and sailed out into the lake and
through the Straits of Mackinaw to
Canadian waters.
Slipping past the patrol boats,
knowing he was about to be a free
man (Canada had no extradition
treaty with the U.S. at the time), McGarigle must have chuckled as he
threw the bottle overboard. When
found, the note would not only put
a thorn in the backside of Matson
and the entire sheriff ’s office, but it
would surely put a smile on the face
of his friend, Edward McDonald.
The “Ed” from the note, McDonald
was McGarigle’s co-defendant, fellow county commissioner, and now
former cellmate. Keeping McDonald
in good spirits hadn’t been easy as
the summer humidity in their cells
climbed and a transfer to the Joliet
Penitentiary loomed, but McGarigle did his best. The truth was, Ed
McDonald’s happiness mattered. As
a long-time board member and the
Cook County Hospital’s engineer,
he knew every detail of the swindles that landed them and the other
county commissioners in jail. But
more importantly, he was brother to
Michael “Big Mike” or “King Mike”
McDonald, boss of the Chicago
Democratic Machine and the city’s
first politician gangster.

5

McGarigle, Ed McDonald, and
Big Mike McDonald form the nucleus of a fantastic story of proudly
corrupt politicians, seemingly-righteous reformers, bag men, kidnappers, and suckered citizens, revealed
through the testimony of the “Great
Boodle Trial” of 1887. The “most
sensational corruption scandal of
the late nineteenth century,” the
Boodle Trial offers a glimpse into the
crooked machine politics of early
Chicago and the equally underhanded tactics of overzealous reformers.
Called by some a “corrective antidote” to “[a]n epidemic of fraud,”
the trial helped galvanize the reform
movement in Chicago, proving that
even well-connected Chicago politicians could be brought to justice. At
the same time, it demonstrated the
lengths—some say necessary; others say illegal—reformers would go
in the pursuit of their goals. Finally,
the trial reminds us of just how entrenched corruption is in Chicago
politics. As dramatic as it was at the
time, the trial may have been the
beginning, not the end, of Chicago’s
legacy of corruption.

C

hicago’s Great Boodle Trial,
which began on June 4, 1887, was
actually two “prolonged and tedious
trials.” The first trial pitted State’s
Attorney Julius Grinnell against
McGarigle and Ed McDonald; the
second was against over a dozen
other commissioners and private
contractors in an “omnibus” pro-
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ceeding. Both cases centered around
the same allegations of public corruption. According to prosecutors,
a ring of crooked commissioners
took control of the Cook County
Board sometime in the early 1880s.
If a company wanted to do business
with the county, it had to pay the
ring a “commission” for the privilege. What we today call a “pay to
play” scheme, this arrangement allowed dishonest commissioners and
business owners to get rich off county contracts secured through bribes
and inflated by padded invoices. Ed
McDonald helped organize the ring
and set up the schemes, while McGarigle, acting as the bag man, collected the bribes and kickbacks—the
“boodle.” Everything led back to Big
Mike McDonald, the man who controlled Chicago’s Democratic Party,
all county patronage, and the county
board.
A sampling of the boodlers and
their schemes, recounted in vivid
detail through the two trials, shows
the power of early Chicago machine
politics and the depth of the commissioners’ individual greed. There
was Harry “Prince Hal” Varnell, a
gambler and saloon owner appointed warden of the Cook County Insane Asylum. Varnell promptly set
up a private office and home on the
grounds of the asylum and outfitted them with “Persian rugs, Brussels carpets, and lace curtains.” He
ordered expensive foods and paid
for the living expenses of his neph-

ews, cousins, and friends, all using
taxpayer money. The asylum’s drug
store and infirmary served as the
“clubhouse” for the ring of commissioners.
James “Buck” McCarthy joined
the county board in 1884. A high
school dropout, former boxer, and
meat packer in the Chicago stockyards, McCarthy’s main qualification
for being a commissioner was his
friendship with Big Mike McDonald. McCarthy’s protégé was Charles
Lynn, who served as a deputy sheriff
and commissioner. Lynn admitted
to joining the board “solely for the
money he could extort,” recounting
his “scorn” for Chicago industrialists
who refused to pay the ring its expected commissions. Charles Frey,
another McDonald-controlled commissioner, was warden of the county poor house. He bought silk underwear costing eighty-five dollars,
charging it to the county as a bale of
muslin.
And then there was McGarigle.
Warden of the county’s 600-bed hospital for the poor, McGarigle’s office
was adorned in the finest imported damask drapes. China spittoons
flanked his office door. He even had
a private horse stable built on hospital grounds for his personal use. In
one of the more farcical accounts, it
was reported that McGarigle had 24
lightning rods mounted on a hospital tool shed—one “on every chimney, every alcove, every corner, and
every crevice.” The lightning rods
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Several men sitting on benches along a hallway in the Cook County Hospital, 1911, DN-0008937, Chicago
Daily News negatives collection, Chicago History Museum.

were installed by Varnell, a business
agent of the manufacturer.
As the boodlers siphoned off tax
dollars to fund their lavish offices
and private dinners, county patients
suffered. In the Cook County Hospital’s contagious disease ward, “a
cramped, fetid, 18- by 40-foot room,”
patients fought for space on only
six beds, often lying side by side on
the floor. Unlike the $3.00-a-dozen
strawberries and grapes Varnell ordered for his party guests at the clubhouse, patients were served spoiled
meat. The nurses and orderlies often
showed up to work drunk. Similar
conditions were found at the asylum
and the poor house. Newspapers reported that “the poor, the lunatics,
and the sick have fared none too
well, but those who have been hired
to take care of them live in luxury.”

N

ot surprisingly, the boodlers’
largess eventually garnered
notice. In 1886, the county budget
faced a staggering one million dollar
deficit (approximately 25 million in
today’s dollars), which was directly
tied to the reckless spending of the
corrupt commissioners. This rallied
the few reform-minded commissioners on the county board, including J. Frank Aldrich, who was also a
member of the reform-based Union
League Club of Chicago. The Union
League Club joined causes with the
Citizens’ Association, another reform group, whose membership included George Pullman, one of the
wealthiest and most powerful industrialists in the country. Pullman
and the other reformers brought suit
against the county board to enjoin
it from entering into more dubious
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contracts—the first was to drill an
unnecessary artisan well at the poor
house—thereby beginning the “reform movement in county affairs.”
Despite the laudable goal of
ending the “epidemic of fraud” in
county politics, the reformers were
not exactly above reproach in their
tactics. In fact, some of the reformers’ methods rivaled those of the
boodlers. After filing their civil
suit, the reformers funded a private
prosecution of the ring of commissioners. Of the $150,000 raised
(over three and a half million dollars today), at least $30,000 went to
the Mooney and Boland Detective
Agency for the purpose of reviewing county invoices and conducting
non-stop surveillance of county contractors suspected of paying bribes.
When the invoices the detectives
had access to didn’t show evidence of
bribes, the reformers had ones that
did stolen from a county safe. The
“confiscated” documents helped lead
to a raid on the commissioners’ clubhouse, which uncovered additional incriminating evidence.
Now all the reformers needed
was a witness. A corrupt contractor, a plumber named Nic Schneider, gave the reformers what they
were after. Drinking one night at Big
Mike McDonald’s four-story Clark
Street gambling parlor and saloon,
“The Store,” Schneider loudly toasted
to “county contracts,” saying, “I am
rich and by gracious in two years I
shall be as rich as anybody.” Joining

him in the toast was a county commissioner. Two Mooney and Boland
detectives, who had been surveilling Schneider, witnessed the toast.
When Schneider left the tavern, the
detectives followed. Schneider never
made it home that night. Disappearing with him were his business papers, including the false invoices he
wrote to pad county contracts and
evidence of the commissions he paid
to secure county work.
The ring of commissioners
learned through their own private
detectives that Schneider was being
held by the reformers. Based on a
bogus warrant issued for Schneider’s arrest, the commissioners sent
nine policemen to recapture him,
but they were turned away after a
struggle. Schneider, possibly bound
and gagged in a second floor room,
could hear the “ruckus” below as the
men fought over him. He turned
witness for the prosecution soon
after and fled out of state, escorted
(some might say restrained) by two
private detectives.
The reformers may have felt justified using such tactics to secure
evidence against the boodlers given
their control over the jury system.
At the time, the grand jury—the
only body that could issue an indictment formally charging a defendant
with a serious crime—was selected
by the county commissioners. Each
commissioner wrote two names of
prospective jurors on blank cards,
which were then drawn from a hat.
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When a new grand jury was chosen,
one of the corrupt commissioners
simply picked cards that had been
dog-eared by the others in the ring.
This system, though rudimentary,
had been used effectively to shield
machine politicians from prosecution for over a decade. In fact, when
asked about the possibility of indictment, Buck McCarthy commented,
“There are only two powers over the
[county] board, one is the Almighty,
the other the grand jury, and we get
to draw the grand jury.”
McCarthy’s confidence was misplaced, however. After reformist
commissioner Aldrich witnessed the
loaded draw, the reformers were able
to convince a judge to empanel a
special grand jury. The special grand
jurors, “honest and true men who
refused to be bribed or intimidated,”
promptly indicted the ring of commissioners and private contractors
on 106 counts of public corruption.
The reformers had thus broken the
“power of puppet master [Big Mike]
McDonald and his commissioners
to control the selection of grand juries that had protected them from
criminal indictments.”
After unsuccessfully moving for
a change of venue on the grounds
that the prosecution had been improperly funded by private citizens,
the Boodle Trial was underway. The
evidence against McGarigle and
Ed McDonald was overwhelming.
“Witness after witness was placed
on the stand to prove that [they] had
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systematically robbed the taxpayers of this county for a long time.”
Plumber Nic Schneider became the
prosecution’s star. Notwithstanding
accusations of perjury by the defendants, Schneider’s testimony, supported by his false invoices, showed
that Ed McDonald was connected
with four firms that overcharged the
county for goods and labor and that
McGarigle collected and disbursed
the bribes and stolen money. Both
defendants testified in their own defense, but offered contradictory testimony “of the flimsiest character.”
On June 18, 1887, the jury found
both men guilty. Later that summer,
the “other dominoes fell” during the
omnibus trial. When the verdicts
were read, “the ball game at White
Stocking Park was interrupted while
the people cheered.” The penalties
for most defendants were substantial, ranging from thousands of
dollars in fines to three years in the
penitentiary for McGarigle and Ed
McDonald. However, a few received
smaller fines after agreeing to help
the prosecution and paying restitution. Buck McCarthy, who was fined
just $1,000 amid allegations that he
had influence over one of the jurors,
told reporters that he was “disappointed and disgusted” with the verdict. (McCarthy went on to be elected to the Chicago City Council.)
Of course, McGarigle’s flight to
Canada meant he was never fully brought to justice. After living
in Banff, British Columbia for two
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years where he bought into a livery
business and invested in a hotel, he
cut a deal and returned to Chicago.
He eventually ran a tavern in the
Clark Street vice district controlled
by Big Mike McDonald. Ed McDonald didn’t fare as well. While awaiting
transfer to the penitentiary, his nineyear-old son died after falling from a
fire escape at the Cook County Hospital while playing with friends. The

Assistant States Attorney John Bensley explained it this way: “In Mike
McDonald’s case, an indictment
could not be framed to hold. When
a man lays all his plans coolly and deliberately with the express purpose,
apparently, of preventing any tracing
of crookedness to his door it is an extremely difficult thing to get him with
legal evidence.” Big Mike explained it
a little differently, though the senti-

fall was caused by loose boards that
hospital workers had failed to secure
or seal off. Afterward, Ed McDonald
“lapsed into a deep depression.” He
served his time in Joliet but was effectively finished in Chicago politics.
And what of Big Mike McDonald, the boss of the boodlers and the
architect of their schemes? He was
never charged or tried as part of the
Boodle Trial; the grand jury didn’t
even vote on whether to indict him.

ment was the same. Joking to reporters, he said, “[A]fter it’s all over I show
’em a pretty clean pair of heels and I’ll
do it this time or I’m very much mistaken.” He added, “Most everybody’s
a boodler nowadays, you know.”
Big Mike McDonald remained on
top of the Democratic Party for more
than a decade longer, controlling an
empire of gambling parlors, saloons,
and prostitution houses, while directing city and county patronage.
The Boodle Trial did not slow his operations. The same year of the trial,
he was reported to have ordered city
aldermen under his control to ap-

“The Boodlers Convicted,” New York Times headline, June 19, 1887. Facing: Photo of Michael “Big
Mike” McDonald and another man, 1907, DN0005146, Chicago Daily News negatives collection,
Chicago History Museum.

Todd Haugh

prove a $200,000 contract for applying “preserving fluid” to City Hall.
The fluid, which
was “guaranteed
to keep the stately building intact
for a hundred
years,” washed
away in the rain
two days later.
The World’s Fair
that took place in
Chicago in 1893
put more millions into Big Mike McDonald’s pockets as city contracts
swelled and armies of tourists gambled and drank at The Store. It was at
this time that McDonald supposedly
coined the phrase, “There’s a sucker
born every minute.” Big Mike retired
to his Ashland Boulevard mansion in
the early 1900s, content to let the next
generation of boodlers and gangsters
try its hand in Chicago.

T

he legacy of the Great Boodle
Trial and the reform efforts it
epitomized is decidedly mixed. In
some ways, it was a significant victory for early Chicago reformers.
The Boodle Trial was a very public
demonstration that the city’s machine politicians—at least most of
them—were not above the law. All
told, nine commissioners and county contractors who faced trial were
convicted and sentenced to two
years or more in jail; four others were
convicted and fined the maximum
allowed under statute. Up to that
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time, no politician had received such
harsh punishment for “boodling.”
The commissioners’ convictions,
even for those
receiving only
fines, also meant
they would be
automatically removed from the
county board.
By “turn[ing] the
rascals out of
the County Board and brand[ing]
them forever as convicted public
swindlers,” the trial ended most of
the commissioners’ political careers,
and more importantly, Big Mike McDonald’s control over county contracts. The Tribune called the trial
“the most successful assault on public crooks to that date.”
More broadly, the trial and the
scandal leading up to it galvanized
Chicago’s reform-minded citizens,
kick-starting the city’s reform movement. To successfully investigate
and prosecute the ring of commissioners, two reformist groups—the
Union League Club and the Citizens’
Association—joined forces. The alliance brought activist industrialists,
politicians, and judges together, and
allowed for great sums of money to
be raised to combat corruption. The
Boodle Trial was just the first success
of the reformers. After the trial ended, reformers pressured the state
legislature to review how jurors were
selected in Cook County, leading to

12
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a revamped jury system in which
county commissioners no longer
selected grand juries. This allowed
prosecutors to bring public corruption cases under a fair system. With
the help of a press corps intent on
publishing more exposés like those
leading up to the Boodle Trial, reformers went on to successfully investigate and prosecute bail-bond
fraud and ghost payrolling. Some of
these reform movements continue
today.
Yet, to achieve their goals, the
reformers became separated from
the corrupt commissioners by only
a matter of degree. While calling for
the prosecution of Big Mike McDonald—“the managing and directing
thief whose influence has cast such a
blighting shadow over public affairs in
this county”—reformers kidnapped
witnesses, stole documents from a
county safe, and privately funded the
criminal indictments of their adversaries. The reformers’ “ends justifies
the means” rationalization, which
they undoubtedly employed, rings
as hollow as McGarigle’s defense that
the prevailing system was at fault for
his crimes—that he just went along
with the boodling because everyone
else did. While there are safeguards
in place today to guard against the
use of such “impure methods,” many
contend the prosecutions of recent
Chicago politicians have been motivated less by enacting genuine reform and more by furthering political gain. One current Cook County

Commissioner, William Beavers,
awaiting trial for allegedly failing to
pay taxes on money he took from
his campaign fund (and used to
pay gambling losses, among other
things), has accused prosecutors of
indicting him as retribution for refusing to wear a wire against John
Daley, a former commissioner who
is brother to Richard Daley, Chicago’s longest-running mayor.
The best measure of the Boodle
Trial’s impact is, of course, whether
it changed the culture of corruption
in Chicago politics. On that score,
the trial has had little lasting impact.
The headlines of today’s Tribune
read much as they did 125 years ago.
Month after month, colorful Chicago politicians fight indictment (some
from their county board seats) for
schemes that would get an approving
nod from Big Mike McDonald. Beavers is the most recent, and possibly
the most odd (after being indicted,
he called the United States Attorney
prosecuting him a “rooster with no
nuts”), but he is by no means alone.
On its way to earning the distinction of being the most corrupt city
in the country, Chicago has seen five
of its governors imprisoned, over 30
aldermen indicted and convicted,
and countless other public officials
investigated. At the top of that list is
former Governor Rod Blagojevich,
who is currently serving a 14-year
prison term for attempting to auction off President Barack Obama’s
vacant United States Senate seat for
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personal gain. Wiretaps of Blagojevich recorded him saying, “I’ve got
this thing and it’s f—ing golden, and
. . . I’m just not giving it up for f—in’
nothing.”
It could be argued that these
prosecutions even taking place,
some against officials at the highest
levels of government, proves that the
Boodle Trial has had a lasting impact—the trial showed generations
of reformers that political corruption
could be combated in Chicago in a
meaningful way. Others will more
cynically say that for every crooked
politician prosecuted, another will
take his place, and that the most
well-connected crooks—the crafty
bosses like Big Mike McDonald—always find a way to operate above the
law. While the truth is likely somewhere in between, the Great Boodle
Trial reminds us most of all that as
long as there is boodle, there will be
men trying to take it. As McGarigle
remarked a few months before his
conviction, “I don’t care if the same
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system prevailed in heaven, there
would be boodlers. The temptation is too great. . . . Men are but
human[.]” ◆
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Rookery Building, Historic American Buildings Survey, Library of Congress.

THE ROOKERY BUILDING
AND CHICAGO-KENT
A. Dan Tarlock

C

hicago-Kent traces its origin to the incorporation of
the Chicago College of Law in
1888. Chicago-Kent’s founding coincided with the opening of the Rookery Building designed by the preeminent architectural firm of Burnham
and Root. There is a direct connection between the now iconic Rookery Building, located at Adams and
LaSalle, and the law school building
further west on Adams. There is also
a more indirect but interesting connection between the first and second
schools of Chicago architecture and
Daniel Burnham’s vision of the modern city. Architects, but especially
Daniel Burnham, helped make and

sustain Chicago as a world city, thus
making it an attractive and exciting
place to practice law to the benefit
of all law schools in Chicago including Chicago-Kent.
The Rookery is now a classic example of the first school of Chicago architecture which helped shape
modern Chicago and continues to
make Chicago a special place, despite decades of desecration of this
rich architectural heritage. The Great
Fire of 1871 destroyed the Loop and
the newly developed residential areas to the north. It did, however, narrowly miss the lumber yard which
occupied the site of the current law
school. Architects were immediately
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attracted to Chicago because of the
opportunities to rebuild the city.
The skyscraper was perfected here,
and this technological innovation,
along with the telephone and Otis
Elevator, created the modern office
city by separating industrial production from its administration. By
1888, Chicago, along with Buenos
Aires and Sao Paulo, was emerging
as a major example of a modern city
unconstrained by any significant urban past. The city had grown from
about 100,000 persons when Lincoln was nominated for President,
a few blocks from the current law
school, to one million inhabitants
and counting.
Chicago had surpassed Philadelphia and became America’s second
city. Chicago’s location as a rail and
water hub enabled it to become the
processing center for the agricultural
bounty of the Midwest and Great
Plains as well as the distribution center for this region. For a brief period
of time, wealthy Chicagoans used
their new wealth and power to patronize a progressive group of architects to build modern, forward-looking cathedrals of commerce.
A group of Chicago architects,
led by Dankmar Adler, Louis Sullivan, John Root, Daniel Burnham
and later Frank Lloyd Wright, developed a distinctive style of architecture geared to the technological
innovations that were changing the
nature of business. The Rookery is
a perfect example. The walls were
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partially load-bearing, but the interior used the state-of-the-art steel
frame, developed by William Jenny,
to permit it to become the tallest
building in Chicago. The building
is a mix of early modernist and retrospective styles. The walls of large
windows allowed maximum use of
light because of the dimness of the
20 watt bulbs powered by Commonwealth Edison’s first loop generating
station across the street. The exterior
building is also an example of Chicago Romanesque. This style, whose
distinctive feature was the arch, was
based on pre-Gothic Romanesque
architecture in southern France. Initially adopted by Frank Richardson
in Boston, the great Louis Sullivan
brought it to Chicago. The Auditorium
Theater, which opened in 1889, is
the best surviving example.
After the elite lost interest in
“modern architecture,” innovation
languished in Chicago until the
post–World War II modernist school
emerged. Until the 1980s, Post-War
Chicago architecture was a monument to Mies van der Rohe. Fleeing
Nazi Germany, he ultimately settled
in Chicago, headed IIT’s then Department of Architecture, designed
its landmark campus, and more
generally helped make the German
Bauhaus the dominant form of post–
World War II Chicago architecture.
The law school’s current building,
which opened in 1992, is a synthesis
of the two great schools of Chicago architecture. Its scale and facade
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“Rookery Building, exterior,” photo from 1891, Images of America Collection, Frances Loeb Library.

recall the post-fire Prairie School,
especially the Rookery Building.
However, the incorporation of an
arch into early designs was rejected
as disproportionate to the building.
Not only is it about the same height,
it was designed by Holabird and
Root, the successor firm to Burnham
and Root. The relatively austere stone
facade, rather than a pure steel and
glass frame characteristic of Mies’s
main campus buildings, echoes the
Rookery in both style and underlying philosophy. And, like the law, it
both respects the past and looks to
the future. Burnham rejected the argument of Louis Sullivan and Frank
Lloyd Wright that America needed
a distinctive style of architecture.
Rather, “Burnham and his allies,” as

the Encyclopedia of Chicago explains,
“believed that the sometimes frantic
quest for ‘American-ness’—the obsession with New World originality
and horror of all things European—was itself a kind of insecurity,
and that maturity would consist in
an acknowledgment that America
was not culturally isolated from the
rest of the world. Burnham and his
associates saw the United States as
a rightful heir to the traditions of
Western culture.”
Daniel Burnham’s larger legacy
for Chicago and its vibrant legal
community is twofold. First, Prairie
School architecture both symbolized
Chicago’s emergence as a world city
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by allowing it to drain
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the surrounding region of both resources and talent, legal and otherwise. This legacy along with Burnham’s partially realized 1909 plan
also helped Chicago to evolve into a
major financial center, after its original industrial base of Chicago eroded
after World War II. The concentration of law firms to serve Chicago’s
economy provided employment for
thousands of lawyers.
The second legacy of Burnham’s
plan is much darker but also benefitted Chicago lawyers. The much hailed
plan envisioned Chicago as a great
city in the mold of Paris or Imperial
Vienna. But the plan primarily concentrated on a magnificent core and
lakefront for the wealthy. The unruly, poor, polluted, and dangerous
rest of the city, home to the waves of
immigrants from around the world
and migrants from other parts of the
country, was depicted only by endless low rise, uniform blocks. In other
words, the city that actually existed
was largely ignored. It was left to
others to deal with what was in fact
happening on the streets of Chicago. In the twentieth century, Chicago’s continuing attempts to deal
with urban problems such as racial
segregation, urban poverty, substan-
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dard housing, rampant corruption,
and juvenile and gang violence have
provided endless opportunities for
lawyers and future lawyers trying to
obtain justice for individuals caught
in the net of poverty, corruption,
brutality, and discrimination equally
characteristic of Chicago, including
a young Columbia University graduate (and Chicago-Kent commencement speaker), Barack Obama. ◆
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The Legal Aid Society, established in 1905 from a merger of PAWC and the Legal Aid Bureau, photo by
Charles J. Bernauer, 1919, ICHi-36161, Chicago History Museum.

INVENTING LEGAL AID:
WOMEN AND LAY LAWYERING
Felice Batlan

W

hen we think of extraordinary nineteenth century legal institutions
and innovations, we generally do
not think of women. In fact, in 1875,
the United States Supreme Court
ruled that Illinois’ refusal to admit
women to the bar did not violate the
newly passed Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Yet
remarkably, in 1885, women in Chicago created the Protective Agency
for Women and Children (PAWC),
which was one of the very first organizations in the country to provide
free legal aid to the poor.
The PAWC began inauspiciously

and indirectly. In 1876, Caroline
M. Brown, a wealthy woman and
mother of two children, founded
the Chicago Women’s Club (CWC)
by inviting 21 women to meet in
her living room to learn about and
discuss the day’s pressing social, political, and cultural issues. Brown
was acutely aware of the limited
sphere in which elite women could
maneuver respectably and worried
that some might take a dim view of
the club. Yet, in the aftermath of the
disastrous 1871 fire, Chicago was
a particularly hospitable place for
such a group, as women had created organizations to provide charity
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and relief to victims of the fire. Thus
a tradition of middle-class and elite
women’s organizing already was beginning to develop in Chicago.
One of the first projects of the
CWC was to place a woman night
matron in each police station and
the club hired and raised funds for
the matron’s salary. The issue of having women police matrons was one
embraced by numerous women’s
organizations across the country. It
was an appropriate women’s issue because it involved the supervision of
working-class and poor women under the rationale of protecting such
women’s virtue from male prisoners
and from policemen (often immigrant men). Responsibility for the
matron gave CWC members cause
to visit the jails as well as to follow
jailed women’s cases through court
proceedings. They observed firsthand the treatment of poor women
and girls in Chicago courts as defendants, witnesses, and victims.
These experiences underlay the
CWC’s decision to create the Protective Agency for Women and Children in 1885. The PAWC announced
as its objective: “To secure justice for
women and children, to give legal
counsel free of charge, and to extend moral support to the wronged
and helpless.” Significant to notice
here is that the PAWC limited its
clientele to women. In fact, gender
was fundamental to how members
of the PAWC viewed themselves,
constructed their roles and du-
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ties, and defined the problems that
they sought to solve. According to
the PAWC, elite and middle-class
women had a unique responsibility
to protect poor and working-class
women from a host of dangers and
injustices. Central to the PAWC’s
ideology was the argument that men
as a whole had failed to create a moral and just society. Instead, men had
constructed a world that was rife
with injustices to women and governed by a corrupt political system
in which men put self-interest before
the public good.
Charlotte Holt was hired by the
PAWC as the organization’s superintendent. She ran the office and interviewed women who sought aid. She
and her assistants, board members,
and volunteers then would investigate cases and attempt to settle them.
A male attorney would become involved only if a lawsuit was filed,
which was a rare event. Each year,
the number of clients to whom the
PAWC ministered grew exponentially.
In its first year, the PAWC handled
156 cases, in its third year 1,145, and
by 1905 over four thousand. There
were few rules regarding the types
of cases that the PAWC would take.
Rather it functioned flexibly and
often improvised, meeting needs as
they arose. Thus unlike the practice
of most later legal aid societies, the
PAWC did not have eligibility requirements, did not require that a
client be worthy, and was entirely
unconcerned that it might take cases
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away from attorneys. As the PAWC’s
superintendent stated, “We do not
make any rules, but judge of each
case as it comes to us.”
The two largest categories of cases
were wage claims involving women
whose employers had failed to pay
them and domestic relations claims.
In wage cases, Holt and other board
members, using their influence and
persuasion through letters and personal visits, pressured employers to
pay such wages. This form of conciliation was used so often that the
PAWC dubbed it “White Mailing.”
The “white” was intended to imply
that it was done in the name of justice, morality, and the public good,
as opposed to blackmail which was
done for self-interest.
The bulk of the PAWC’s domestic
relations cases raised issues of abandonment and/or non-support of
wives by husbands. These cases went
to the heart of the PAWC’s belief in
the absolute obligation of a husband
to support his wife and children. In
a typical case, a woman would appear at the PAWC’s office claiming
that her husband disappeared weeks
ago, leaving her penniless. Now the
landlord was demanding rent, and
the furniture was being repossessed.
At times, the husband was close by
living with relatives and at other
times he had traveled far away. Often the wife would have some sense
of where the husband was staying
and where he worked. The PAWC
would take the case, search for the

husband, threaten him with a lawsuit for failure to support, and collect support payments for the wife.
If the husband did not agree to pay,
the PAWC often would convince
his employer to pay wages directly
to the PAWC for the benefit of the
wife. Actions such as these combined the threat of litigation with
public humiliation by making visible a man’s failure as a breadwinner.
In the small number of cases where
these methods failed, the PAWC
might file a lawsuit against the husband for non-support. Meanwhile
the PAWC also would negotiate with
the landlord and furniture dealer for
lower or postponed payments. The
PAWC rarely initiated lawsuits and
this was for good reason. A lawsuit
would require that the PAWC’s male
lawyer become involved. Even more
important, the PAWC had little faith
in the courts and did not believe that
courts could actually deliver justice.

T

he PAWC’s vision of legal aid
went well beyond representing
plaintiffs in claims for monetary
damages. Rather the PAWC devised for itself the mission of overseeing the court system’s treatment
of poor and working-class women’s
cases involving sexual assault. The
PAWC declared that they intended
to protect such women from a legal
system that too often failed to take
seriously cases in which women
made claims of rape or sexual abuse.
Rather, courts and the state dis-
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missed charges, charged defendants
with minor offenses, or even found
defendants innocent in cases where
significant proof of abuse existed.
The PAWC argued that defendants’
lawyers endlessly delayed cases and
inappropriately influenced judges.
If a trial occurred, the defendant’s
lawyer humiliated the victim by attacking her character and chastity.
Likewise the state’s attorney, who
was at best overworked and apathetic, could not be relied upon to prosecute cases fully.
Leaders of the Agency also believed that the court system was
filled with justices of the peace and
police magistrates who had obtained
their appointment through political
connections and were often corrupt.
By contrast with corrupt non-elite
justices of the peace, police magistrates, and lawyers, PAWC members
considered themselves more competent and certainly more virtuous. In
1887, the PAWC confidently wrote
a letter to state appellate judges regarding the deplorable state of the
lower courts. The letter declared,
“We have had cases in which we
believe political influences have
governed the Justices. We have had
cases in which sympathy with vice
seemingly decided the question. We
have had cases in which the attorney for the accused controlled the
Justice, and it was deemed impossible to secure a fair hearing.” They
further complained of intentional
delays, mind-numbing technicali-
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ties, discourteous treatment by court
personnel, crowded courtrooms,
and magistrates’ and court officers’
lack of sympathy with or concern
for poor women. The letter urged
the appellate justices to appoint only
the most qualified attorneys to judicial positions. Regarding the issue
of qualifications, the PAWC’s complaints were laden with contradictions. Even its most powerful and
active members did not have formal
legal training, and the PAWC’s mission was to exert their own influence
over judges.
Part of what the PAWC found so
objectionable was that police magistrates and other lower court judges
were not only deeply ensconced in
politics but were also non-elite, often
immigrant men. The PAWC’s attack
on court officials reflected their larger fear of the power that immigrants
and non-elite men, through political
connections and the system of Chicago’s ward bosses, had obtained. By
contrast with the supposedly illegitimate power exercised by court officials, the members of the PAWC saw
themselves and the power that they
exercised to be earned, natural, and
above reproach.
When the PAWC learned about
a case of sexual violence, it became
involved in multiple ways, including
conducting its own investigation,
gathering evidence, and speaking
with judges and attorneys. At times,
PAWC members would pressure
the state’s attorney into allowing the
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PAWC’s own attorney to prosecute
cases. In their own words, they would
act “the sister’s part.” One of the
PAWC’s best-publicized and most
visible tactics was to appear en masse
in courtroom proceedings involving
cases of sexual assault. In doing so,
they functioned as judicial watchdogs whose presence was intended
to shame court officials and lawyers
into proper behavior. PAWC members walked a fine line in assuming
this role, as truly respectable women rarely appeared in court, which
all recognized as a masculine space.
Chicago’s police courts were roughand-tumble places—crowded, noisy,
filled with smoke, and teeming with
defendants of all sorts. These were
hardly places where ladies appeared.
Responding to the PAWC’s actions,
some court officials declared that the
courts, especially police courts, were
not an appropriate place for respectable women. Such judicial opprobrium only increased the PAWC’s tenacity and paradoxically augmented
the impact had by the public nature
of their protests. As the PAWC explained, “The presence of a delegation of reputable women, women of
social position and influence, changes the moral tone of Police court,
and imparts courage to a timid girl,
whose very innocence confuses her,
in the presence of so many strange
men.”
As PAWC members invaded the
courtroom, they also began to question substantive and evidentiary laws

regarding sex crimes. Particularly
infuriating was how defense lawyers raised issues of a victim’s consent and used past sexual conduct
to demonstrate consent, even when
crimes involved girls. The PAWC
strongly condemned as hypocritical
the double standard that permitted
men to have sex outside marriage
while condemning women who did
so. Connecting this understanding
to the legal arena, they sought to
make a woman’s chastity and morality irrelevant to the question whether
she was the victim of a sex crime. As
members continued to attend court,
they began to assert that the courts’
unfair treatment of women in cases
regarding sexual violence was not
caused only by individual men’s behavior. Rather, the PAWC insisted,
this unfair treatment was engrained
into law and required the enactment
of new laws that would exclude evidence of a women’s chastity or previous conduct. It explained, “[I]mmorality should be no hindrance to
legal rights in one sex more than the
other.” It also campaigned to raise
the legal age of consent, which in
Illinois was ten for a girl. Laws raising the age of consent went handin-hand with reforming evidentiary
rules and burden of proof standards,
as statutory rape made questions of
consent and a girl’s character and past
sexual conduct moot. As the PAWC
understood, such reformed laws removed a judge’s discretion and further
controlled defense attorneys’ behavior.
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Significantly, the PAWC did not
conceptualize its legal work as distinct from its other work, which included providing non-legal advice,
giving financial aid, locating lodgings, finding employment, and seeking medical services for its clients. It
would have made little sense to the
women of the PAWC to believe that
the purpose of legal aid was simply
to provide their clients the ability to
go to court separated from a concern
with substantive justice or material
well-being. Moreover, they claimed,
the PAWC provided its clients with
“self-respect” and “self-dependence.”
The women of the PAWC also
tended to accept the stories told by
those women seeking their help. In
other words, they presumptively believed their clients rather than finding their stories suspect. Moreover,
they appreciated the importance of
allowing clients to tell their stories
slowly, which they asserted “busy
lawyers would not bear.” As they recognized, many women who sought
help did not have legally cognizable
claims. But they believed that client
narratives had value in and of themselves. “Many a tale of woe is told
in our office, the mere listening to
which by sympathetic and intelligent women is all the help possible.
It is astonishing how grateful some
of these women are for the opportunity of telling their trials to such lisPhoto of Lucy Louisa Flower, long-time officer of the
PAWC, Chicago Markers of Distinction, http://chicagotribute.org/Markers/Flower.htm.
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teners.” For a poor woman to tell her
story to a middle-class or wealthy
woman and to have her listen to and
acknowledge her story must have
given the poor women a sense of
empowerment and agency.
Like attorneys, volunteers and
employees of the PAWC treated all
conversations with clients as confidential, often refusing to write or
speak about individual cases. As
Holt wrote, “Much of our work is of
a confidential nature, and as our aim
has always been to encourage women
to come to us for advice and counsel, it has been one of the essential
stimulants to them to be assured of
the strictly private nature of all work
that could be kept private.” Thus the
Agency never publicly discussed its
cases in any detail, even in its fund-
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raising materials. By contrast with
a variety of reform organization,
especially those related to women,
the PAWC eschewed melodramatic
narratives of seduction and betrayal
of young women. In their view, such
stories and issues were so serious
that they needed to stand outside
popular discourse. They were not to
be traded upon and instead were to
be treated as precious.

E

arly in its history, the PAWC’s
members correctly understood
their power as coming from their
class and social position. As time
passed, they began to base their
claims to expertise and authority
on their growing legal knowledge
and experience. They proudly proclaimed that the bench and the bar
recognized and appreciated their
expertise. The PAWCs relationship
to judges and attorneys was complicated, because they simultaneously
looked down on many lawyers and
judges while still longing for their
acceptance and basking in their
compliments. When long-time officer and board member Mary Potter
Crane died, the PAWC boasted that
“she had a judicial mind, and was
always welcome at the State’s Attorney’s office, and her advice and
counsel in difficult cases . . . were
frequently sought by attorneys.”
Likewise, one board member wrote
that Charlotte Holt “has so won the
respect and confidence of the courts
that whatever case she presents

is sure of respectful hearing.” The
PAWC was also particularly proud
when, in the late 1890s, they received requests from judges to have
the PAWC station a representative
in every police court to handle cases
involving women, an affirmation
of the PAWC’s importance and its
members’ legal and practical expertise.
The work of the PAWC had lasting influence not only in shaping the
idea and practice of providing organized legal aid to the poor, but also
in building Chicago’s specialized
courts, including its juvenile and
domestic relations courts. A number of women who were officers of
the PAWC played significant roles
in the creation of these courts and
the PAWC may have functioned as a
model for such courts. Both of these
courts were intended to move away
from an adversary model of law and
sought to minimize the role of lawyers. Likewise, tremendous discretion was vested in social workers,
often women, whose job was to understand holistically those who appeared before the court. They were
to use such knowledge to fashion
individual solutions and such courts
were intended to be flexible institutions not bound by strict understandings of the rule of law.
The PAWC was an extraordinary
institution. At a time when only a
miniscule number of women were
lawyers, it created a space in which
women provided legal advice to
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other women. Situated within a
thick network of women’s clubs, the
PAWC expanded its activities to provide a wide range of legal services to
women, and it refused to make hard
distinctions either between the types
of cases that it would handle or between legal versus non-legal cases.
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In 1905, the PAWC became the Chicago Legal Aid Society and its vision
of legal aid as part of a continuum of
care became the hallmark of a Chicago-style of legal aid which is still
with us today. ◆
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“Telegraph operator printing telegram,” photo by Waldon Fawcett, c. 1908, National Photo Company Collection,
Library of Congress.

WHAT'S A TELEGRAM?
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.

W

hen Chicago-Kent’s predecessors were founded
in 1888 there were no
e-commerce, wireless access to media,
e-mail, Facebook friends, or airline
delays. That does not mean, however,
that people did not shop remotely, enjoy entertainment, communicate with
friends, or travel. They just did them
in other ways, all of which sometimes
spawned disputes, some of which
found their way into the courts. What
follows is a story of the dreams of 125
years ago. The characters are fictional. What they talk about is not.
✳

✳

✳

Annie Morton, 22, had just finished
playing “Now Where Did You Get
That Hat?” on the piano in the parlor
of the rooming house at 2210 South
Prairie Street in Chicago.
“I should like to have one just the
same as that!
“Where’er I go, they shout ‘Hello!
Where did you get that hat?’” she
sang.
Patrick Boland, still dressed in his
telegraph messenger’s blue uniform
with red trim, sat on the couch by
the piano and applauded. His cap
with a prominent brass number “79”
sat on the table beside him.
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Annie giggled and then looked at
Luther Wardell, who was sitting
in a plush chair beside the couch.
“What’s the matter, Luther?” she
asked. “You don’t like it? It’s one of
the most popular songs this year.”

fice, but I’m up to $20.”

“Oh, I’m sorry!” Luther said. He
plucked at his blue denim trousers.
“I enjoyed it. I was just thinking
while I listened.”

“It’s not boring at all. It’s exciting,”
Patrick said, glancing at his cap
proudly and determined to gain the
upper hand against Luther. “We’re allowed to take on special errands for
our customers. One guy who owns
the livery stable up by the river paid
me two dollars to follow his wife and
report to him that she had spent a
good part of her day with one of the
stable boys.” He was disappointed by
Annie’s lack of reaction.

“About the strike?” Patrick asked.
“Yeah. I think I’m just going to go
home and help work the farm. I
didn’t think they’d fire all of us. Who
knew that they’d be able to get hundreds of strike breakers to work as
switchmen and brakemen within a
week.”
“That’s the CB&Q Railroad for you,”
Patrick said. “They’re even nastier to
their passengers than to the brakemen. They’re tough.”
“Everyone is tough,” Luther responded. “I’m sick of it. You come to
Chicago to make your fortune, and
everyone holds you down. There are
no decent jobs.”
“Sure there are,” Patrick said. “I’ve
got one, with American District
Telegraph Company. When I was
started, at age twelve, the pay was
$17 per month. Now, I’m one of
about one-hundred boys employed,
most in the La Salle Street central of-

“Oh, we know, we know,” Luther
said. “Seven long years you’ve been
telling us your boring stories about
it.”

“I’ve heard that Western Union pays
better,” Annie said. “They have about
140 boys, about half of them working
out of the main office at La Salle and
Washington Streets.” Annie liked to
tease Patrick almost as much as she
liked playing music.
“It’s not so bad,” Patrick said. He liked
for Annie to think well of him. “We
wait on benches at the office and get
called in turn, according to when we
went out last. Almost everyone rides
a safety bicycle now. When a customer rings his call box, we ride out
and pick up a handwritten message
and bring it back for transmission.”
“What’s a safety bicycle?” Luther
asked.
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“You are a farm boy,” Patrick laughed.
“You ought to get one. They’ve been
out for three years. They’re much
better than the old kind with a large
front wheel and a smaller rear one.
These new ones have pneumatic
tires.”
“I can’t afford one now,” Luther said
glumly.
“I don’t like it that we have to pay for
our own uniforms,” Patrick admitted. “They cost $12, and they take it
out of our pay.”
“I bet you have to buy your own bicycle, too,” Luther said. “That’s not
for me. I’ve got loans to pay back
now.”
“You had to borrow money only because you lived so high during the
strike. You should have saved up beforehand,” Annie said.
She shifted her attention back to Patrick. “You’re a thing of the past,” Annie said. “What do people need with
telegraph boys when they can just
use the telephone?”
“Don’t be ridiculous,” Patrick said.
“Telephones will never replace the
telegraph. Everyone knows that. Did
you see the article in the January 1,
1888, Chicago Daily Tribune?”
“Frank, the Telegraph Boy,” illustration (uncredited)
from The Telegraph Boy by Horatio Alger, Jr., 1879.

“No.”
“It was headlined, ‘Telephones a Nuisance.’ It quoted the Reedy Elevator
Manufacturing Company as saying,
‘The service we receive is not at all
satisfactory, and if all instruments
could be removed we would have
ours fired at once. Would much prefer the old system of messengers, letters, or dispatches, as frequent costly
errors are made by telephone, which
you cannot trace to any reliable party.
We don’t think the telephone company has sufficient assistance in their
offices to wait on calls promptly. Frequently we ring three or four times
before we hear the lazy “hello?” and
more frequently they reply, “Busy
now—call again,” or “Busy; will ring
you up when through.” But they nev-
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er ring. We consider it very poor service. But as our neighbors and customers have the phone we must keep
up with the procession.’”
“That’s not fair,” Annie said. “I work
very hard. So does everyone else.”
“We’re all getting screwed,” Luther
said. “And now, that robber baron,
Benjamin Harrison, stole the election from Grover Cleveland.”
“He’s not a robber baron,” Annie said.
“I wouldn’t think you would favor
Cleveland. He vetoed pensions for
veterans. He’s not for the common
man. And he’s a sympathizer for the
South. He would have never supported the women’s suffrage movement. We’re poised to get something
done, now, on the amendment. The
two main organizations merged last
year.”
“Women’s suffrage—pshaw!” Luther
said. “Next thing they’ll want is to
shut down the saloons.”
“It would help you save money for
a bicycle, if they were shut down,”
Annie said. “Anyway, I’m going to
do my part. I’m going to become a
lawyer.”
“A lawyer!” Patrick said. “You can’t
be a lawyer.”
“Yes I can. Did you see the story in
the September 7, 1888, edition of the

29

Chicago Daily Tribune? Miss Emma
Baumann and Miss Ada Dalter applied for admission to the Chicago
Evening Law School. Several of the
seventy young men already enrolled
objected and went to Judge Moran,
one of the founders, who rebuked
them and said that the precedent
was well established that women
could be admitted to the bar. I’m going to apply.”
“Even if they let you in,” Patrick said,
“and even if you get admitted to the
bar, no one will give a girl lawyer any
work.”
“I hope you won’t borrow any money for that,” Luther said, laughing.
“You’d be better off borrowing it to
go to saloons.”
“I’ve already got a promise of some
work,” Annie said. “One of the mechanics at the telephone company
wants me to help him get a patent
for his idea for a new switchboard
apparatus. It’s a good idea. The days
of making a telephone call by signaling a switchboard operator and
giving her the name of the person
to be called are over. They have just
introduced five-digit numbers to
accommodate the rapid growth in
subscribers. Now automatic dialing
is being introduced in Chicago—”
“Because of the rude and lazy operators,” Luther said.
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“What does this guy look like?” Patrick asked.
“Jealous?” Annie teased.
“Well, you ought to think about it,”
Patrick said. “You’re on the verge of
becoming an old maid.”
“And all the inventiveness is already
producing lots of lawsuits—more
work for lawyers,” Annie argued.
“Alexander Graham Bell and Western Union are suing each other.
Morse’s patent for the telegraph is
always being challenged.”
“Keep your job, but organize,” Luther said. “Launch a strike against all
this mechanical foolishness, taking
away jobs. It was bad enough on the
railroad.”
“Oh, right,” Annie said. “It’s a wonder you still have all your fingers.
They need to make the Janney automatic coupler mandatory.”
“I guess I don’t have to worry about
that anymore,” Luther said, flexing
the fingers on both hands and looking at them. “That’s another thing a
union could do for us. The most basic goal, though, is to insist on what
the Congress just did for mail carriers: making eight hours a full day of
work, with overtime pay for hours
worked over eight.”
“That’ll never happen,” Patrick de-

clared. “And they shouldn’t have
done it for the post office workers.
They don’t work as hard as we do,
and we damn sure don’t have a deal
like that.”
“They deliver mail twice a day to residential customers and four times a
day to businesses,” Luther said.
“It would be quicker if they rode bicycles, like we do,” Patrick said.
“Just wait,” Annie said. “Bicycles
aren’t the future. Self-propelled carriages are. The Wisconsin legislature
just awarded a prize for a steam-propelled carriage that completed a
race from Green Bay to Madison, a
distance of 201 miles at an average
speed of six miles per hour.”
“That was nine years ago,” Luther
said. “And nothing has come of it.
There’ll be flying machines before
horses and railroads need to be
afraid.”
“Better try to get a union for the
horses,” Annie said. “There will be
flying machines. Four years ago, a
man named John Joseph Montgomery made a glider flight near San Diego.”
“Yeah, but you can’t put a steam
engine in a glider,” Patrick said. He
laughed. “If they could, Luther, you
can make sure they hook them together with automatic couplers. A
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Photo of telephone operators sitting at a switchboard, 1903, DN-0001438, Chicago Daily News
negatives collection, Chicago History Museum.

flying train!”
“I’m telling you,” Annie said. “People are inventing things all over the
place. Pretty soon, I won’t have to
learn the new songs to play them on
the piano. Thomas Edison just got a
patent for a machine that plays music from grooves etched on a wax
cylinder.”
“Well, I guess they can stop work
on the Auditorium Theatre,” Patrick
said, “even though it’s scheduled to
open next year. President Harrison
and Vice-President Levi Morton
are supposed to come to the grand
opening. They’ll be disappointed to
hear that all the operas and plays
are going to have to find somewhere
else to perform in Chicago. Oh—I
forgot—there won’t be any operas
and plays. They’ll be a thing of the

past. Everyone will stay at home,
sit on the couch and listen to ‘phonographs.’ They’ll all get fat, and no
one will learn how to play the piano
anymore.”
Annie ignored him. “And he just
applied for another one: an ‘Optical Phonograph,’ capable of showing pictures in full-motion. Already,
people are excited about the Kodak,
the first roll-film camera just patented. And a man named Herman
Hollerith received a patent for an
automatic tabulating machine. You
punch numbers into paper cards and
his machine sorts them.”
“You must have gotten into your
mother’s laudanum,” Patrick said.
“Next thing you’ll predict is sending telegraph signals through the air,
without wires.”
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“It’s possible,” Annie said. “An English scientist, James Clark Maxwell,
has already proven mathematically
that electricity can be transferred
through free space, and a German,
Heinrich Hertz, has demonstrated it
in his laboratory.”
“Things are changing pretty fast,”
Luther said, showing a spark of enthusiasm for the first time. “There
sure is a lot of stuff being invented
on the railroads,” Luther said. “The
Janney automatic coupler is one;
airbrakes before that. Now, people
are working on automatic signaling
systems and even on ways to replace
the steam locomotive with some
kind of engine that burns fuel inside
the cylinders. I’ve been coming up
with some ideas of my own before I
got caught up in the strike.” A hint
of sadness returned to his face. “One
thing I’ll miss is all the machinery.”
He thought for a moment and then
rushed on: “Think about what Old
Man Sears and his partner Roebuck have already done. Their new
‘Sears & Roebuck’ catalog was just
published from their new office on
Homan Street. It advertises watches
and jewelry, which can be purchased
by mail. ‘Book of Bargains: A Money
Saver for Everyone,’ ‘Cheapest Supply House on Earth,’ and ‘Our trade
reaches around the World,’ he brags.
People are ordering them like crazy.
There’s no reason they can’t include
other stuff, like sewing machines,

sporting goods, musical instruments, saddles, firearms, buggies,
bicycles, baby carriages, eyeglasses,
clothing . . . ” He looked at Patrick.
“Or safety bicycles,” he said.
“She must have given you some of
the laudanum,” Patrick said. “Steam
powered gliders linked with automatic couplers, card sorting machines linked with vapor telegraph
signals. Just imagine!” Patrick chuckled. “For that matter you could order
from the catalog with a vapor telegram. Old Man Sears would track
the orders by sorting the cards, and
deliver the stuff by steam powered
gliders and steam carriages.”
“I tell you what, Luther,” Annie said.
“Don’t go back to the farm. Stay
here, with us. I’ll become a lawyer
and help you get patents on all the
stuff you’ll invent—if you keep all
your fingers. Go talk to Reverend
Frank Wakeley Gunsaulus, the minister at Plymouth Congregational
Church. He’s already trying to persuade Philip Armour to extend his
grant for the Sunday School that Julia Beveridge is running to establish
a new kind of school where students
of all backgrounds can prepare for
meaningful roles in a changing industrial society, to study mechanics,
chemistry, architecture, and library
science. They already have something like that in Boston. It’s named
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—‘Boston Tech,’ most people
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call it.”
Luther looked at her.
“We’d make a good team,” she urged,
with a quick glance at Patrick.
“Who knows?” Luther added. “Maybe we’ll get married.” He leered at
Patrick.
“Maybe,” Annie said, “Even though
Patrick is cuter in that uniform. Put
on the hat, handsome.”
“Ha!” Luther said. “I can just see it.
He’ll still be riding his safety bicycle
around the streets of Chicago asking
people if they want to send a telegram,
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and they’ll say, ‘What’s a telegram?’”
Annie laughed. Patrick tried to
smile, the hat halfway to his head.
“And then,” Luther said, looking at the
hat and laughing harder. “They’ll say,
‘now where did you get that hat.’” ◆
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Advertisement for the Kodak camera, c. 1890.

PRIVACY & TECHNOLOGY:
A 125-YEAR REVIEW
Lori Andrews

T

he year the Chicago-Kent
College of Law was founded, a new consumer product
arrived on the scene: the portable
camera. Before then, taking someone’s photo was a big deal. A person
would get dressed up and go to a studio. Photos were not taken without a
person’s permission. But the portable camera changed all that—and in
the process led to the development
of legal rights of privacy that endure
today.
An 1890 newspaper article
warned:
Have you seen the Kodak fiend?
Well, he has seen you. He caught

your expression yesterday while
you were innocently talking at the
Post Office. He has taken you at a
disadvantage and transfixed your
uncouth position and passed it on
to be laughed at by friend and foe
alike. His click is heard on every
hand. He is merciless and omnipresent and has as little conscience
and respect for proprieties as the
verist hoodlum. What with Kodak
fiends and phonographs and electric search lights, modern inventive genius is certainly doing its
level best to lay us all out bare to
the gaze of our fellow-men.

Like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram,
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Snapchat and YouTube today, the
portable camera fundamentally
changed the way other people and
institutions could peer into people’s
lives. But the issues raised by today’s
cutting-edge technologies are similar
to those raised by the Kodak fiend.
In the late 1800s a lawyer, Samuel
Warren, married the daughter of a
Senator. He was unprepared for the
incessant media attention to their
union, fueled by the newly-developed portable camera. After his children were born, paparazzi would
snap photos of the babies when the
family took walks down the street.
Annoyed, he thought about what
legal recourse he might have. Were
there any legal precedents for a
“right to be let alone”? He pondered
the issue with a friend from law
school, Louis Brandeis. They could
have suggested that people no longer had a right to be left alone because technologies could now track
and record what they did. Instead
they noted that the intrusiveness of
technologies like the portable camera made it even more important
for people to have control over information about themselves. “The
intensity and complexity of life attendant upon advancing civilization
has rendered necessary some retreat
from the world,” they wrote, “so that
solitude and privacy have become
more essential to the individual; but
modern enterprise and invention
have, through invasion upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain
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and distress, far greater than could
be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”
Their article, “The Right to Privacy,” was published in 1890 in the
Harvard Law Review. They demonstrated that a privacy right had a
basis in fundamental Constitutional
values, such as the right to refuse to
testify against oneself, and common
law principles, such as the “right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to
others.”
“The protection afforded to
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions
. . . is merely an instance of the enforcement of the most general right
of the individual to be let alone,”
they said. “It is like the right not to
be assaulted or beaten, the right not
to be imprisoned, the right not to be
maliciously prosecuted, the right not
to be defamed.”
Their ideas were incorporated
into law through the creation of four
distinct legal actions for invasion of
privacy: for intruding on someone’s
seclusion, for publicly disclosing
private information, for putting a
person in a “false light” in the public
eye, and for appropriating someone’s
name or likeness for commercial use.
They advocated that information
about and photos of people could
be disseminated if they had consented or if the matter was of legitimate public interest. Since then, the
fundamental Constitutional right
to privacy has additionally been in-
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terpreted to include a right to make
important personal decisions, such
as whether to use contraception or
whether to homeschool your child.
The mode of analysis of the two
Boston lawyers from a century ago
has been used to analyze each new
technology that has reached the
courts. How does it affect the indi-

ultimately, privacy prevailed.
When Charles Katz entered a
public phone booth in 1965, he never
imagined that cops would tap the
phone line. The cops charged him
with placing illegal bets—and he
protested that they had infringed the
Fourth Amendment limits on governmental intrusion into a person’s

vidual and society? How do fundamental legal values help to protect
the individual when the technology
is used? As each new technology has
been adopted—including forensic
technologies, medical technologies,
and computer technologies—the application of fundamental values has
been used to protect, and often expand, people’s privacy rights. Sometimes courts, lacking the comprehensive analysis of technology like
the one undertaken by Warren and
Brandeis, took missteps when they
first encountered a technology. But

private life. The trial judge said that
wiretapping didn’t violate the Fourth
Amendment because the Founding
Fathers drafted the Constitutional
provision to honor people’s privacy
in their homes. In this case, the police hadn’t trespassed into his home.
In fact, there had even been a Supreme Court decision on the matter,
back in 1928, when cops had used
earlier wiretap technology to learn
that someone was violating Prohibition.
In that earlier case, Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928),
the five-justice majority of the U.S.
Supreme Court had held that a

“The Kodak Fiend,” Hawaiian Gazette, December 9, 1890,
Chronicling America Collection, Library of Congress.
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bootlegger’s privacy hadn’t been
invaded and he hadn’t been forced
to incriminate himself because, although police had recorded the calls
he was making from his home, the
wiretap equipment had been placed
on phone lines outside his home.
Writing for the dissent was none
other than Louis Brandeis, who was
then a Supreme Court justice. He argued that fundamental values had to
be applied to new technologies. He
noted that when the Constitution
was adopted, “force and violence”—
torture and breaking into people’s
houses—were the only ways that the
government had to obtain private
information about people. The Constitution protected against force and
violence. But, said Brandeis, “discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by means
far more effective than stretching
upon the rack, to obtain disclosure
in court of what is whispered in the
closet. . . . The progress of science
in furnishing the government with
means of espionage is not likely to
stop with wiretapping. Ways may
some day be developed by which the
government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it
will be enabled to expose to a jury
the most intimate occurrences of
the home.” According to Brandeis, the
Constitution’s fundamental value of
privacy and the right not to incriminate
yourself needed to be applied not only
to “what has been, but of what may be.”

F
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orty years after the Olmstead
decision, when Charles Katz’s
case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, the majority of the
justices applied Brandeis’s logic.
Even though Charles Katz was using a public phone booth, the Court
said that the Constitutional right of
privacy “protects people, not places.”
What a person seeks to preserve as
private, even in a public place, may
be Constitutionally protected.
The Supreme Court protected
Katz’s privacy by enunciating a legal
test that is still used today: Did the
person have an “expectation of privacy” and was that an expectation
that society was willing to protect?
As a result, police need to get a warrant, based on probable cause, before
they tap someone’s phone.
The march of law enforcement
technology continued, and in 2001,
a new forensic technology reached
the court. A federal agent suspected
Danny Kyllo of growing marijuana.
Since growing pot indoors requires
high-intensity lamps, the agent sat in
a car across from the home and used
an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan Kyllo’s home. The
scan showed that the roof over the
garage and a side wall of the home
were relatively hot compared to the
rest of the home and substantially
warmer than neighboring homes
in the triplex. The agent concluded
that Kyllo was growing pot and convinced a judge to allow him to search
Kyllo’s home. The agent found pot,
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and Kyllo was convicted on a drug
charge. Because the thermal scanner did not physically intrude on the
house and did not show any private
human activities, the trial court said
that it hadn’t infringed Kyllo’s Constitutional rights.
The appellate court, too, held that
Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had
made no attempt to conceal the heat
escaping from his home, and “even
if he had, there was no objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy
because the imager ‘did not expose
any intimate details of Kyllo’s life,’
only ‘amorphous “hot spots” on the
roof and exterior wall.’”
When the U.S. Supreme Court
took the case, it reversed Kyllo’s
conviction. “It would be foolish to
contend that the degree of privacy
secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology,” wrote Justice Antonin Scalia.
“Where, as here, the Government
uses a device that is not in general
public use, to explore details of the
home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a
‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court
in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (2012), assessed the use of a
GPS tracking device installed on a
car driven by Antoine Jones, a D.C.
nightclub owner. Jones was the tar-

get of a narcotics investigation by
police and the FBI. The Court held
9 to 0 that the twenty-eight-day warrantless use of the GPS violated the
Fourth Amendment. In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor pointed
out how the fundamental right to
privacy was salient even in today’s
world. “GPS monitoring generates
a precise, comprehensive record of
a person’s public movements that
reflects a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,”
wrote Sotomayor, adding, “People
disclose the phone numbers they
dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the
e-mail addresses with which they
correspond to their Internet service
providers; and the books, groceries
and medication they purchase to
online retailers. . . . I for one doubt
that people would accept without
complaint the warrantless disclosure
to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the
last week, or month, or year.” Justice
Sotomayor also was concerned that
“[a]wareness that the government
may be watching chills associational
and expressive freedoms.”
Contemporary medical technologies, such as genetic testing, have
also raised disputes about the reach
of privacy principles. When genetic testing became possible, people
were tested without their knowledge
or consent. Doctors and researchers
would use blood that people had
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given to labs for routine cholesterol
or pregnancy tests and perform additional testing, without the person’s
consent, for everything from breast
cancer to Alzheimer’s disease. The
argument was, what’s the harm? The
person had already been pricked; the
additional tests involved no additional intervention. And even if the
blood was collected anew—as in a
forensic DNA test—blood tests were
safe and noninvasive.
But then employers and insurers
started discriminating against healthy
people based on their genetic predisposition to future disease. With certain genetic mutations, for example, some women had a higher risk
of developing breast cancer than
other women. Even with those mutations, half the women would not
develop breast cancer. Some women
didn’t want to know whether they
had the mutations or not. They said
they would feel like they had a time
bomb ticking away inside them. But
employers and insurers wanted that
information to make their decisions.
There were no legal limits on what
could be done with that information.
During routine physicals, an
employer in California asked the
company doctor to surreptitiously
test the female employees to see if
they were pregnant and the African-American employees to see if
they carried the sickle cell anemia
gene mutation. The results were not
disclosed to the employees, but they
were put in to their personnel files.
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When the existence of the files
leaked, the employees sued. The trial
court dismissed the case, saying that
the test was a modest intrusion, no
more than what people usually undergo in a physical. But the appellate
court held that genes contain personal information that is protected
by the fundamental right to privacy.
“One can think of few subject areas
more personal and more likely to
implicate privacy interests than that
of one’s . . . genetic make-up,” wrote
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d
1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998). Since
then, Congress has passed a law, the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, specifically prohibiting
employers and insurers from discriminating against people based on
the results of genetic tests. People’s
privacy rights include the right not to
have genetic information generated
about them or used against them.
Even computer technologies that
collect data about people have been
subject to a fundamental rights analysis. When Judge Robert Bork was
nominated for the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1987, Michael Dolan, a
Washington, D.C. newspaper reporter, attempted to discredit him by
publishing his video store rental records. In today’s world, Judge Bork’s
choices seem tame: British movies,
Bond movies, costume dramas. The
reporter was disappointed not to see
legal movies such as 12 Angry Men
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or To Kill a Mockingbird. Instead,
Judge Bork had rented “only one
truly court-related tape”: The Star
Chamber.
Bork did not get the Supreme
Court nomination. But the publication of his video rentals did get
the attention of Congress. “It is nobody’s business what Oliver North
or Robert Bork or Griffin Bell or Pat
Leahy watch on television or read or
think about when they get home,”
said Senator Pat Leahy. “In an era
of interactive television cables, the
growth of computer checking and
check-out counters, of security systems and telephones, all lodged together in computers, it would be relatively easy at some point to give a
profile of a person and tell what they
buy in a store, what kind of food
they like, what sort of television programs they watch, who are some of
the people they telephone. . . . I think
that is wrong. I think that really is
Big Brother, and I think it is something that we have to guard against.”
Senator Paul Simon agreed.
“There is no denying that the computer age has revolutionized our
world. Over the past twenty years
we have seen remarkable changes in the way each one of us goes
about our lives. Our children learn
through computers. We bank by machine. We watch movies in our living
rooms. These technological innovations are exciting and as a nation
we should be proud of the accomplishments we have made. Yet, as we

continue to move ahead, we must
protect time honored values that are
so central to this society, particularly
our right to privacy. The advent of
the computer means not only that
we can be more efficient than ever
before, but that we have the ability to
be more intrusive than ever before.
Every day Americans are forced to
provide businesses and others personal information without having
any control over where that information goes. . . . These records are
a window into our loves, likes, and
dislikes.”
The legislators applied the fundamental Constitutional right to privacy and passed a law in 1988 forbidding disclosure of people’s video
rental records (or, in this day and
age, what they watch on Netflix).
The bill prohibits video stores from
disclosing “personally identifiable information”—information that links
the customer or patron to particular
materials or services. In the event of an
unauthorized disclosure, an individual
may bring a civil action for damages.

T

he concerns raised by the disclosure of Bork’s video records
are mild when compared to today’s
digital invasion of privacy. A billion people have joined Facebook,
a population only slightly smaller
than either of the two largest countries, India and China. Marketing
companies, political candidates, law
enforcement agencies, employers, and
other social institutions peer through
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the keyholes of people’s lives by assessing the information and photos
that individuals post and that third
parties post about them. Even more
troubling, data aggregators use surreptitious tracking mechanisms to
follow people across the web and use
that information to make judgments
about them. If a woman does a Google
search for old guitars and then seeks
a credit card, she will be offered a
credit card with less advantageous
terms—not because her credit is
bad, but because garage rock bands
in general are less likely to pay off
their credit cards. If she has a photo of herself with a wineglass in her
hand, she may be denied a job. Seventy-five percent of employers look
at people’s social network presence;
one-third reject people who have alcohol in a Facebook photo. And, as
with past technologies, courts and
legislatures have been slow to protect privacy, initially holding that

privacy rights are lost “on affirmative
keystroke.”
In just the past two years, however, courts and lawmakers have
begun to protect freedom of expression and privacy on social networks.
In Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 650 F.3d 205 (3d. Cir. 2011),
and J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, 650 F.3d 915 (3d. Cir. 2011), the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that public high school students had
a First Amendment right that covered their posts on social networks
even if those posts were critical of
school administrators. And a few
state legislatures—including that of
Illinois—passed laws prohibiting
employers from asking for the social
network passwords of an employee
or a job applicant. That Illinois law
went into effect 125 years after Chicago-Kent College of Law opened its
doors. The Illinois governor came to
the campus to sign the bill into law
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and was introduced by a ChicagoKent student who was working on
internet privacy issues.
The Warren and Brandeis article
not only created a legal framework
that still applies today to safeguard
people’s privacy, it also established
a method for judging new technologies. The authors analyzed how fundamental values inherent in the U.S.
Constitution and common law provide a basis to make judgments about
new technologies. They also assessed
how new technologies affected individuals, institutions, and the larger
society. Warren and Brandeis did
not suggest that individuals adapt to
each new technology, but instead advocated that society assure that each
technology was employed in a way
that was consistent with fundamental societal values.
When Brandeis was appointed
to the U.S. Supreme Court 26 years
after his privacy article appeared,
he continued to champion the application of Constitutional values to
modern technologies. He also wrote
about the nature of a Constitution.
“Time works changes, brings into
existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be
vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave
it birth. This is peculiarly true of
Constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet
passing occasions. They are, to use
the words of Chief Justice Marshall,
‘designed to approach immortality

as nearly as human institutions can
approach it.’ The future is their care,
and provision for events of good and
bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application
of a Constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been but of what may be.”
When the law school opened its
doors 125 years ago, it would have
been difficult to imagine the hightech world of today. But by learning
about cutting edge technologies as
well as fundamental legal principles,
the students at IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law have been well educated, in every era, to face their generation’s legal challenges. ◆
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Photo of John Montgomery Ward, 1922, Bain Collection, Library of Congress.

JOHN MONTGOMERY WARD:
THE LAWYER WHO TOOK ON BASEBALL
Christopher W. Schmidt

A

s 1888 drew to a close, John
Montgomery Ward stood
atop the world of professional baseball. The star shortstop
had just led the New York Giants
to the National League pennant, followed by a triumph over the St. Louis
Browns of the rival American Association in what even then went by
the inflated title of baseball’s “World
Series.” A dominating pitcher early
in his career (he threw the second
perfect game in major league history), an arm injury forced Ward
to recreate himself as an infielder,
where he became one of the best
fielders and hitters of his era. He was
lauded in the press as a ballplayer

with “few equals and no superiors,”
and “by long odds the most popular player in the profession.” These
accomplishments would eventually
earn Ward a place in the Baseball
Hall of Fame.
Ward’s skills on the ball field were
only a part of what made him such a
remarkable figure. Contemporaries
and historians alike have struggled to
describe him. One adjective-happy
biographer took the saturation approach: he was a “jug-eared, willowy,
peach-fuzzed, overreaching punk”
as well as “honorable, smart, and tenacious.” More admired than liked
seems to have been the consensus
view of Ward contemporaries. In a
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profession not known for intellectualism, he stood out. Although Ward
left school at the age of thirteen in
order to pursue his baseball career,
he eventually earned, in his spare
time, degrees in political science and
law from Columbia. He was said to
speak five languages. A regular contributor to newspapers and periodicals, in 1888 he published Baseball:
How to Become a Player, which he
described as a “handbook of the
game, a picture of the play as seen by
a player.”
Ward was also a pioneering labor
leader. In 1885, he established America’s first sports union, the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball
Players. Initially designed to help
sick, injured, or hard-up ballplayers
and promote professional standards,
the Brotherhood quickly evolved
into something approaching a craft
union for ballplayers. Ward had forward-looking attitudes on race as
well. At a time when the color line
was hardening in American society,
and organized baseball had become
a whites-only affair, Ward urged the
Giants to sign an African-American
pitcher.
If all this wasn’t enough, Ward’s
social life was also noteworthy. In
1887 he married a New York actress
and socialite, Helen Dauvray, who
also happened to be a passionate
baseball fan. “Her tiny hands beat
each other rapturously at every victory of the Giants and her dark eyes
were bedewed at every defeat,” re-
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ported the New York Times. “But
the thousands of spectators who observed Miss Dauvray’s emotions little suspected that one of the Giants
had any precedence over the others
so far as her affections were concerned.” She had donated the Tiffany
trophy that went to the World Series
champion; it was the “Dauvray Cup”
that her husband brought home at
the end of the 1888 season. In How
to Become a Player, the ever gallant
Ward included a chapter explaining
the basics of the game “for the benefit of those ladies whose escorts either cannot, or will not, answer their
questions.” He also offered advice for
his gentleman readers: “Whoever
has not experienced the pleasure of
taking a young lady to her first game
of ball should seize the first opportunity to do so.”
Life was not all three-hit games
and celebrity life for the great Monte Ward, however. His relationship
with Helen Dauvray was strained
almost from the start. He was carrying on an affair, and she knew it; she
wanted to return to the stage, and he
didn’t want her to. They lived together for only a year and soon divorced.
His baseball career too was about
to veer off in some unexpected directions. Following his World Series triumph, Ward captained a team of National League all-stars that traveled
around the globe between October
1888 and April 1889 in an effort to
promote the game overseas. It was a
grand gesture, fitting for an emerg-
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ing era of American nationalism
and confidence on the international
scene. But the world tour also helped
set in motion one of the most significant upheavals in baseball’s history.
The man who organized and led the
tour around the globe was Albert
Goodwill Spalding. Soon after they
returned home, he and Ward would
face off in an epic struggle for the future of the game.
Spalding, a star pitcher in his
younger years, now owned the Chicago White Stockings of the NaJohn M. Ward, New York Giants baseball card portrait, 1887, Library of Congress. Facing: Photo of
Albert Goodwill Spalding, 1910, Bain Collection,
Library of Congress.

tional League in addition to a burgeoning sporting goods empire. The
game never had a more effective and
more passionate salesman. Baseball,
he once wrote, captured the nation
because “it is the exponent of American Courage, Confidence, Combativeness; American Dash, Discipline,
Determination; American Energy,
Eagerness, Enthusiasm; American
Pluck, Persistency, Performance;
American Spirit, Sagacity, Success;
American Vim, Vigor, Virility.”
(Spalding also basically created baseball’s all-American birth myth, which
conveniently featured a future Civil
War hero, Abner Doubleday, in 1839
dreaming up the game in bucolic
Cooperstown, New York. In fact,
baseball had largely evolved from
various children’s games; if it ever
had a proper birth moment, it was
among young professionals in 1840s
New York City.) Spalding envisioned
the world tour as an opportunity to
sell two things he loved above all:
the game of baseball and the equipment that bore his name. Despite his
background as a player, and despite
his overwrought romanticism about
the national pastime, Spalding approached his role as a team owner
from the perspective of the captain
of industry that he had become: the
players were employees, and comfortably paid ones at that; and it was
the owner’s job to control costs and
ensure a compliant workforce. Needless to say, he didn’t think much of
Ward’s efforts with the Brotherhood.
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T

he world tour had just reached
Cairo, Egypt, in February 1889
when the players received news that,
at their winter meetings in New
York, the National League owners
had adopted a major reform designed to reign in player salaries.
They created a player classification
system under which “Class A” players earned $2,500, “Class B” players
$2,250, and so on, down to “Class E”
players who earned $1,500. The classifications scheme took into account
not only player ability, but also “conduct, both on and off the field.”
Ward, who had already established himself as his generation’s
most outspoken critic of baseball’s
distinctive labor practices, saw the
plan as an affront to the players.
What made working as a professional ballplayer different from any
other occupation was the “reserve
clause,” a provision in player contracts under which an owner could
“reserve” a number of players when
the term of their contracts ended.
The clause prohibited the player
from negotiating with another team
unless his team released him. As
professional baseball was controlled
by an agreement between the teams
under which each team agreed to
respect the player contracts of other teams, the reserved player faced
three options: sign a new contract
at the terms dictated by the owner;
hold out and hope for better terms;
or stop playing baseball. Owners
defended the reserve clause as es-
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sential to ensuring the stability of
the game. It did indeed further this
goal. But there was another reason,
one they didn’t trumpet so proudly: it kept down player salaries. And
here too it was effective. In the late
1880s, as club profits tripled, player
salaries grew by only 30 percent, a
fact at least partly attributable to the
reserve system.
In 1887, Ward had a scathing attack on the reserve clause, titled “Is
the Base-Ball Player a Chattel?” He
compared the reserve clause to “a fugitive-slave law”: it “denies [the player] a harbor or a livelihood, and carries him back, bound and shackled,
to the club from which he attempted
to escape.” The remedy, according to
Ward, was simple: get rid of “baseball law” and allow “the business of
base-ball to be made to rest on the
ordinary business basis.”
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When he learned of the owners’
classification plan, Ward was so incensed he threatened to abandon the
world tour to come home and confront the owners. (The news that the
Giants were trying to trade him only
added to his frustration.) He suspected that Spalding had planned the
entire trip just to get him and some
of his allies out of the country in order to go forward with their plans.
If this was indeed Spalding’s plan
(and there is no evidence it was), it
backfired, as the tour ended up giving some of the game’s top players
long hours to share their grievances.
The plan for the baseball revolution
that would upend the game in 1890
might very well have been hatched
in quiet conversation among the
players while on Spalding’s world
tour. Nearly all the players on the
tour would join Ward’s revolt against
the National League.
During the 1889 season, Ward
began preparations for the creation
of a rival major league, the Players
League. Working in secret (he was,
after all, still on the enemy’s payroll),
he found financial backing and convinced many of his fellow players
to commit to the new league. Some
aspects of the Players League looked
familiar. The players were familiar—the new league lured many of
the best National League players to
its rosters. And the cities in which
they played were familiar—the seven cities in which their eight teams
played were all cities that already

had National League teams. But the
business model behind the Players
League was radically different from
anything that had come before.
Each club was run by an eight-man
board, consisting of four players and
four investors. The league was governed by a senate-like organization,
with two representatives from each
team (one elected by players, one by
owners). Players had three-year contracts, and no reserve clause. Investors were promised the first $10,000
of each club’s net profit, with the rest
to be divided among the players.
Spalding and the National League
attacked the Players League. First,
they turned to the courts: the Giants
sued Ward for breach of contract.
Ward had violated the terms of his
reserve clause, they claimed, and
they asked a New York state court
to issue an injunction prohibiting
Ward from playing for anyone else.
The court denied the injunction. As
the reserve clause failed to specify
such essentials as Ward’s salary and
the terms of the renewed contract,
the judge concluded that it was too
indefinite to be treated as a binding contract for the 1890 season.
The court also raised the disturbing
question of whether, assuming the
reserve clause were read to constitute a binding contract for the following season, the renewed contract
would also include a reserve clause.
If so, the player would be tied to his
current team for as long as the team
desired, while the team could release
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a player with only 10 days’ notice.
This was rather absurd, according
to the judge. “We have the spectacle
presented of a contract which binds
one party for a series of years and
the other party for 10 days, and of
the party who is itself bound for ten
days coming into a court of equity to
enforce its claims against the party
bound for years.” The judge concluded that the reserve clause was unenforceable for “want of fairness and of
mutuality.”
With the courts refusing to help,
Spalding turned to public opinion.
He pulled out all the rhetorical stops.
What the players were doing was
“secession,” a “revolt,” a “war”; the
National League was confronting
“hot headed anarchists” who were
leading a “revolutionary movement.”
But the fall of the Players League
after just one season came not from
Spalding’s attacks in the press, nor
from legal challenges. It came from
the marketplace. The new league
had the best players, but this was not
enough. With three major leagues
competing for a limited fan base,
everyone suffered at the gate. At
season’s end, when Spalding opened
negotiations with Players League investors, he pointedly excluded Ward
and any other players. “[T]he monied men met with the monied men,”
as Spalding put it. The National League
owners simply bought out their
competition; several Players League
clubs were integrated into a reconfigured National League. Ward’s rev-
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olution was over.
Ward returned to the National
League, where he played four more
seasons. He was still one of the best
players in the league when he retired
in 1894. He went on to be a successful lawyer, a gentleman farmer, and
a top amateur golfer. Although he
mended fences with organized baseball, his passion for the cause he had
led never left him. In 1925, shortly
before his death, he gave a speech—
at an event to celebrate the National
League, of all places—recounting
the events of 1888–1890 in which he
made clear that the war against the
National League, while doomed, was
justified.

F

or a brief moment, the Players
League presented a radical alternative business model for professional sports, one in which the players and owners shared control of the
game as well as its profits. With the
failure of Ward’s baseball revolution,
the owner-dominated system lived
on. In the following decades, various
teams would go to court to have the
reserve clause enforced against players who had jumped their contracts
(a relatively common occurrence
any time there was a rival league that
refused to abide by the agreement
that controlled the baseball monopoly). Judges, with only the rarest of
exceptions, sided with the players,
often citing Ward’s case as authority on the matter. The reserve clause
lived on, however, and it did so be-
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cause the baseball monopoly, while
periodically challenged, remained in
place. As long as owners respected
the contracts of their on-the-field
competitors, they did not need the
courts. For this reason, the most
significant legal challenges to baseball’s unique labor practices came in
the realm of antitrust, not contract
law. But baseball law survived this
challenge too, as the United States
Supreme Court granted, and then
twice reaffirmed, that federal antitrust law did not apply to professional baseball.
When change eventually came in
the 1970s, it was at the hands of another organized players movement,
but this time it was achieved not
through a rival league but through
labor negotiations (with a critical assist from a sympathetic arbiter). Today, major league baseball operates
in a way that has some similarities
to the core premise of the alternative
model Ward had offered. The game
is governed, in large part, through
collective bargaining agreements between players and owners. With the
skyrocketing of player salaries after

the fall of the reserve clause, the game’s
profits are far more evenly distributed between players and owners.
It took almost a century, but John
Montgomery Ward’s vision for major league baseball has, in some part,
been realized. ◆
Sources and Further Reading

■ Stuart Banner, The Baseball Trust: A History of
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption (2013).
■ Robert F. Burk, Never Just a Game: Players, Owners, & American Baseball to 1920 (1994).
■ Brian Di Salvatore, A Clever Base-Ballist: The Life
and Times of John Montgomery Ward (1999).
■ Mark Lamster, Spalding’s World Tour: The Epic
Adventure That Took Baseball Around the Globe—
And Made It America’s Game (2006).
■ Harold Seymour, Baseball: The Early Years (1960).

Christopher W. Schmidt graduated
from Dartmouth College and received his
law degree from Harvard Law School and
a Ph.D. in the History of American Civilization from Harvard University. Prior
to joining the faculty at Chicago-Kent in
2008, he taught history at Phillips Academy, Andover, and Dartmouth College.
His scholarship focuses mostly on constitutional law, legal history, and civil rights,
with occasional teaching and writing forays into sports law and history.

•

51

52

Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress

“The fog,” Puck cartoon by Will Crawford, 1911, Library of Congress.

U.S. ANTITRUST: FROM SHOT IN THE
DARK TO GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
David J. Gerber

W

hen the United States
Congress enacted the
first “antitrust” law in
1890 it was taking a shot in the dark.
At the time there was no concept of
“antitrust law”—i.e., a general legal regime intended to combat restraints on competition. Today more
than 100 countries have such laws,
including all significant participants
in the global economy. Competition
law has become a major factor in economic life throughout much of the
world. U.S. antitrust law has played
a central role in this remarkable evolution, and it is generally acknowledged to be the most important of

these laws. It is the touchstone and
frame of reference for international
discussions, and it is often used as
a model or at least a major source
of guidance by other countries in
developing their own competition
laws. The story is extraordinary, interwoven with the roles of power
and ideas and intertwined with the
evolution of the U.S. and its role in
the world. This brief essay sketches
its trajectory. Chicago-Kent’s role as
an educational institution tracks that
trajectory.

David J. Gerber

I. A Shot in the Dark

T

his new type of legislation was
a “shot in the dark” in the sense
that few, if any, of the legislators had
any way of knowing what consequences the legislation would have.
They were “shooting” at something,
but they didn’t know what they
might actually hit. So what were they
trying to do and why?
Antitrust law was, above all, a
response to social turbulence and
tensions. The United States in the
1880s presented a complex mixture
of hope, fear and resentments. The
terrible Civil War was a memory,
but not a distant one. Rapid industrialization was creating great wealth
for a few and jobs for many. Immigration was bringing millions from
Europe to take those jobs and to find
land to farm in the Midwest and the
West. Yet the rapid changes also generated sectional conflicts and social
tensions, and political and legal institutions strained to respond effectively to them.
This mixture of pressures, conflicts and resentments led Congress
to enact what came to be known as
antitrust law. One key background
factor was the resentment that many
felt towards the new super rich and
their lavish and ostentatious lifestyles. Located primarily in New
York and other cities on the East
Coast, these groups had achieved
great wealth quickly, often through
control of large manufacturing busi-
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nesses. These firms often dominated
specific industries, and this dominance allowed them to exclude new
entrants from those industries. It
also allowed them to extract what
many viewed as unfair prices and
conditions on their suppliers as well
as their employees. This led to anger at the power of these so-called
“trusts” and often combined with
anger at the power of their owners
to control the destinies and stifle
the possibilities of others, especially
those in other parts of the country.
A specific catalyst for antitrust law
was rising anger among Midwestern
farming communities at what they
saw as rapacious and monopolistic
conduct by railroad companies and
others whom they believed were
manipulating prices paid to farmers for their grain and livestock.
Groups representing these interests
pressured their representatives in
Congress to do something about the
“trusts” that were amassing fortunes
for a few, but exploiting vast numbers of hard-working farmers and
tradesmen.
Congress responded to this
pressure by enacting the Sherman
Antitrust Act in 1890. The name
that soon attached to the legislation—“anti-trust”—reflected its goals.
It was a tool to be used to combat the
monopolistic abuses of very large
enterprises. There was, however, no
model for Congress to use in doing
what it wanted to do—or wanted
to appear to be doing. So Congress
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“punted”—it simply federalized two
barely used legal principles. It took
two concepts from the common law
that had been used for quite different
purposes, first in England and then
to a limited extent in the U.S., and it
made them enforceable under federal law. The statute was very short,
and its basics have not changed since
1890. The first concept was “restraint
of trade.” This concept had been
used primarily in civil cases to combat overly restrictive provisions in
contracts. The second basic idea was
“monopolization.” It had also been
part of the English common law, but
for centuries it had been little used
in either England or the U.S. The legislation contained virtually no guidance as to the substantive content of
the provisions, leaving issues of content to the federal courts.
The Sherman Act transformed
the role of these private law concepts
by providing that the federal government could enforce them. Congress
appears to have given little thought
to how this was to take place. It did
not create specific procedure for the
enforcement of the antitrust provisions. It merely authorized the U.S.
Justice Department to file claims in
the regular courts, using the normal
rules for civil proceedings. Given that
the federal government was still very
small in 1890, the legislators could
hardly have envisioned extensive
federal administrative application of
the provisions. Some assumed that
private actions could be brought on

the basis of the legislation, and this
was confirmed a few years later.
This was the “shot in the dark!”
The U.S. Congress was responding
to specific domestic pressures. The
legislators just took common law
concepts and gave the federal government authority to use them in
the federal courts. The legislators
paid little, if any, attention to how
others in the world had dealt with
similar issues or what, if anything,
they might think about the U.S. experiment. They just experimented,
basically relying on judges to sort
out the issues and develop the law.
II. An Antitrust System Develops

P

rior to the Second World War
the system evolved slowly and
fitfully according to a pragmatic,
court-based process—typical of U.S.
legal development generally. The
judges were solving the conflicts before them, and there is little evidence
that they thought about their decisions as creating a “system” of antitrust law. They relied on accumulated practical experience, domestic
conceptions of the judicial role, and
often on ideologies about the role
of markets as they shaped the content and roles of antitrust in the U.S.
There were relatively few cases, and
other than in a few large companies
there was relatively little interest in
this area of the law.
After the war the roles and importance of antitrust law expanded
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greatly. One factor was transnational. Antitrust came to be seen in
the U.S. as a part of a global “mission” to provide an antidote to fascism and to support freedom. Many
believed that the concentrations of
economic power in Germany and
Japan were at least in part responsible for the horrors of the Second
World War, and they saw antitrust
as a means of preventing such concentrations or at least curbing the
resulting abuses. This led U.S. government officials and others actively
to promote antitrust in Europe. A
European version of antitrust law
had begun to develop in the 1920s,
but it had not gained much status in
most European countries, and thus
U.S. antitrust became a symbol of restructuring in Europe, both in individual countries and in connection
with the process of European integration. At the same time, the economic and political dominance of
the U.S. in the so-called “free world”
allowed the U.S. to apply its antitrust
law to conduct outside its own territory and thus further support the
antitrust mission.
This heightened political, symbolic and economic importance of
antitrust on the international plane
combined with the de facto protection of the U.S. market encouraged
rapid growth in the perceived importance of antitrust within the U.S. and
the expansion of antitrust principles.
By the early 1970s antitrust had become a very important part of the
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legal environment of business and as
such it attracted strong interest from
lawyers. The growing importance of
antitrust meant that law schools increased their offerings in the area.
According to Ralph Brill, antitrust was
first taught at Chicago-Kent College
of Law in 1973. This also meant, however, that antitrust represented a major
cost for many U.S. businesses. These
costs were tolerated as long as economic factors (especially currency and regulatory obstacles) buffered U.S. firms
from international competition.
In the 1970s the international
economic picture changed markedly,
and these changes in global economic conditions generated a fundamental change in U.S. antitrust law. The
“oil shocks” of the early 1970s and the
concomitant international currency
restructuring led to increased awareness in the U.S. business community of the need for U.S. businesses to
compete internationally. Antitrust
now began to appear as a burden on
the U.S. economy, and this led scholars to examine ever more carefully
the intellectual justification for such
burdens. Economists and law professors increasingly argued that the
courts had expanded antitrust law
too far and that the entire edifice of
antitrust law should be viewed from
the perspective of its economic impact. This perspective quickly won
favor in the courts and law faculties,
and within a few years it led to a radical revision of standards for antitrust
law in the U.S. The central substantive
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law questions were now to be judged
by economists according to economic
criteria.
III. Global Competition Law Leadership

T

he “shot in the dark” that was
the U.S. antitrust law system is
today no longer solely a domestic
field of law. It is now also a critically important component of global
economic policy! The system that
U.S. judges had evolved to deal with
purely domestic problems and that
relied on little more than confidence
in the capacity of courts to develop reasonable responses to conflicts has been transformed into the
central player in efforts to respond
effectively to economic and other
forms of globalization. It is now a
U.S. export product, and the stakes
are enormous. What directions and
forms will the rules of competition
take? Treatment of these issues will
be a factor in the future of many
countries, including the U.S., and
for more than two decades Chicago-Kent has brought transnational
competition law to our students, and
Chicago-Kent faculty have contributed to the international discussion
of these issues.
A. Foreign Interactions and Perceptions
U.S. antitrust now plays on a
global stage, and much will depend

on how foreign experts, lawyers,
government officials and business
leaders see U.S. antitrust. They will
make decisions about what to do in
their own countries and on the international level. This means that their
perspectives on the U.S. system are
critical to its roles both at home and
abroad, and foreign images of U.S.
antitrust have changed radically. Prior
to the Second World War, those in
Europe who knew anything about
U.S. antitrust law (and they were
few) generally considered it a mistake. They tended to see it as a failure that actually created more harm
than good by forcing companies to
merge rather than cooperate. This
view predominated in large measure
until after the Second World War.
The Europeans were developing a
different concept of competition law
that emphasized administrative control of dominant firms. This conception of competition was spreading
rapidly in Europe in the 1920s, but
depression and war led to its virtual
abandonment.
After that war ended, however,
U.S. antitrust law became associated
with U.S. economic dominance in
the “free world.” The real and imagined connections between economic
concentration and military expansion in both Germany and Japan
convinced many that U.S.-style antitrust law should be used to combat
such concentrations. U.S. occupation forces in Germany and Japan
imposed U.S. antitrust ideas during
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the occupation period, and the U.S.
insisted that both countries either
enact or maintain competition law
after the occupation. This increased
awareness of these ideas abroad.
Perhaps more important, however,
was the perception that antitrust
was a source of strength for the U.S.
economy and thus a potential spur
to growth that other countries could
employ.
U.S.-style antitrust did not, however, always fit well with European
legal traditions and institutions, and
in most European countries skepticism toward the U.S. model limited
progress in protecting competition.
In Germany, however, a separate set
of ideas about how to protect competition developed in the 1930s and
1940s in the underground, and after the war it became the basis for
German antitrust law. From here
it spread to the European level and
became part of the process of European integration. The basic idea of

U.S. antitrust law—i.e., protecting
the competitive process from restraints—was part of this model of
competition law, but the model itself
was conceptually and institutionally
quite distinct. European scholars and
officials in these areas often looked
to U.S. antitrust for comparisons and
insights into problems, but there was
relatively little interaction between
U.S. and European forms of competition law until the 1990s.
In the 1990s these relationships
became far closer and more important for both the U.S. and Europeans. Moreover, the fall of the Soviet
Union precipitated widespread interest in market-based approaches
around the world and revived the
messianic tenor of the U.S. antitrust
law community. Many countries
that had socialist or other command-based approaches to the organization of economic activity now
introduced antitrust laws or significantly increased their investment in
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the enforcement of such laws. Often
they looked to U.S. antitrust officials,
lawyers and scholars for help in implementing or evaluating their new
activities.
B. Policy Issues and Obstacles
This has raised a critically important issue: How will/should
competition law on global markets
be implemented? Globalization has
shown the limitations and distortions of the traditional jurisdictional
system—e.g., differing rules and
procedures for different parts of the
same economic market. Many in
the U.S. and elsewhere believe that
the best response to these problems
is to encourage all countries to follow at least the basic substantive law
approach of the U.S. antitrust law
system. This would generate convergence among competition law systems around the world and reduce
the harms caused by current jurisdictional arrangements. Many others are,
however, skeptical that the U.S. model
should be the focus of convergence.
They often see some form of coordination (perhaps at the World Trade Organization level) as the best response.
How these foreign decision makers and decision shapers understand
and evaluate U.S. antitrust law is
critical to this set of decisions. It is
important, therefore, that they understand as clearly as possible how
U.S. antitrust law works and what
the guiding ideas are behind the law.

Only then will they be in a position
adequately to evaluate it, compare
it with their own systems and make
informed choices in relation to it.
There are many obstacles—linguistic, comparative, political and economic—to achieving an adequate
understanding of the U.S. system
and of the implications of various
policy choices for the global system
and for individual components of it.
Moreover, it is critical that U.S. lawyers, officials and scholars acquire a
better understanding of the competition law elsewhere and thus of the
potential bases for convergence and
coordination on the global level.
IV. Concluding Comments

A

former U.S. antitrust official not
long ago wrote that U.S. antitrust is (or could be) the “light of the
world.” That might be a bit strong,
but U.S. antitrust certainly does play
a key role in the development of the
global economy and its many components. Now the big question is
whether U.S. legal thinking and the
creative and pragmatic impulses that
have been so much a part of U.S. antitrust law will continue to provide
the leadership that can make the
most of these opportunities.
These changes have important
implications for U.S. legal education.
At Chicago-Kent College of Law,
we are doing our part. Here, and
at some other leading law schools,
these issues have generated increas-
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ing attention. Since the 1980s, and
even more so since the early 1990s, I and
others have included transnational issues
in the domestic antitrust course and
included an antitrust focus in courses
such as international business transactions. I have also long offered a
seminar in international and comparative antitrust law that tackles
these issues directly. These efforts
have two central objectives. One is
to educate U.S. lawyers to perform
more effectively in this new global
context. The other is to educate foreign lawyers about U.S. antitrust law
and provide them with tools for understanding and evaluating it and its
global roles.
One fact stands out in 2013 at the
celebration of Chicago-Kent’s 125
years of teaching law. The U.S. will
have to earn its leading role in antitrust law on the global level. Effective legal education in this area will
be a key element in whether it will be
successful in achieving that goal. ◆
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Illustration, from The Life of David S. Terry, by A. E. Wagstaff, 1892, Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/
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THE LEGACY OF IN RE NEAGLE
Harold J. Krent

F

or generations, commentators have decried the fact that
we live in an era of an imperial presidency. The second President Bush famously (or infamously)
ignored Congress in subjecting suspected terrorists around the world to
military commissions at Guantanamo
Bay and citizens and suspected terrorists alike to warrantless surveillance of their phone calls. President
Barack Obama, like his predecessor,
has used executive power to shape
rules and regulations that Congress
had delegated to subordinates in
agencies as opposed to the President
directly. Both Presidents claimed
broad power to circumvent the Senate’s power to consent to treaties and

appointments. Congress and the
courts have fought back to limit the
scope of presidential power, at least
in discrete contexts.
Somewhat lost in history, a comparable battle over executive power
brewed one hundred and twenty-five
years ago, culminating in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1890 decision in In
re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). The case
questioned the President’s inherent
authority to assign a U.S. Marshal
to protect the life of Stephen Field, a
sitting United States Supreme Court
Justice. Marshal Neagle confronted
the potential assailant, David Terry,
and killed him when he thought Justice Field’s life was in danger. California authorities were none too
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pleased given that Terry had been so
prominent in California political life
and that Terry likely was unarmed.
Local officials indicted and then imprisoned Neagle for killing the Californian.
Events leading up to the Supreme
Court decision read like a soap opera,
perhaps revealing more about the
interplay of society and politics than
does the decision itself. The history
of the case starts with David Terry,
who before the Civil War served
on California’s Supreme Court with
Justice Stephen Field. Terry gained
notoriety by challenging Senator
Broderick from California, a former friend who was also a friend of
Field’s, to a duel, which left Broderick dead. The dispute centered over
political rivalries, in part due to Terry’s sympathy with the Confederacy.
Terry was acquitted and then left
California to support the South in
the Civil War. After the War, Terry
returned to law practice and politics
in California and, of relevance here,
within twenty years fell within the
orbit of an apparently glamorous but
unstable woman named Sarah Althea Hill.
In the late 1870s, Hill became
the companion of Senator William
Sharon of Nevada, who had amassed
great sums from real estate and
mining investments. Sharon, who
was much older than Hill, evidently
sundered relations when he suspected Hill’s designs on his money. Hill
continued to plot how to separate
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Sharon from some of his enormous
wealth. She made a demand on
Sharon for alimony, asserting that
Sharon had married her some three
years earlier when they had started
their “companionship.” In so doing, she presented what likely were
forged documents attesting to the
marriage relationship. Sharon sued
in federal court in California (due
to diversity of citizenship) in 1883
for a declaration that no marriage
had ever taken place. Hill then filed
her own suit in state court in 1884
to demonstrate that the marriage
was valid and requested a share of
Sharon’s property. She hired Terry as
one of her attorneys.
The state court bizarrely decided
the case in Hill’s favor even though
the judge labeled Hill a liar. Sharon
immediately appealed to the California Supreme Court but died before the case was heard. His executor
pursued the appeal.
In the meantime, the federal suit
proceeded slowly, prompting more
aberrant behavior from Hill. She
sported a pistol at many of the proceedings, and waved it at witnesses.
She threatened to have adverse witnesses and their counsel killed. Although Justice Field, by then serving
on the U.S. Supreme Court, was not
assigned to preside over the case,
he was assigned as a Justice riding
on circuit to hear several motions
arising out of the case. During one
proceeding, Justice Field in an effort
to maintain decorum ordered that
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Ms. Hill be disarmed, and he found
her in contempt of court. At the end
of the proceedings in 1886, the federal court determined that the marriage was a sham and the documents
forged.
Terry then married Hill, manifesting an intriguing view of the
attorney-client relationship. More
importantly, the marriage placed
pressure on his successors on the
California Supreme Court to uphold
the state court finding that Hill had
been married to Sharon. A divided
California Supreme Court acquiesced, affirming the trial court’s decision that a valid marriage had indeed taken place.
In a complicated procedural
move, the estate then moved to revive
the federal court decree and enjoin
both Hill and Terry from maintaining the validity of the prior marriage,
despite the state court ruling. At
this point, the case was assigned to
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen
Field, sitting by designation. Field
in 1888 determined that Hill had
obtained the marriage documents
through fraud. As he orally delivered
the decision, Hill caused a commotion in the courtroom protesting the
ruling and had to be escorted out.
Terry in a display of chivalry thereupon attacked the marshal for carrying out Field’s order. Field ordered
both Terry, his former associate on
the California Supreme Court, and
Hill imprisoned for contempt of
court. Hill threatened Field’s life and

Terry claimed that Field’s decision had
been bought with Sharon’s money. Terry then sought a pardon from President Grover Cleveland, asserting in
part that Field was retaliating against
him for refusing to throw his support
to Field in a prior presidential primary. Cleveland declined, and Terry
served out his short term.
Upon release, Terry apparently
became even more consumed by
revenge, broadcasting widely his
intent to harm Justice Field. When
Justice Field traveled back west from
Washington, newspapers speculated
on when the confrontation would
occur. Accordingly, President Benjamin Harrison through his Attorney
General assigned Marshal Neagle to
protect Justice Field.

T

he confrontation arose in the
summer of 1889 when Field
traveled by train from San Francisco to Los Angeles. Terry and his wife
boarded the train at a stop along
the way and entered a dining room
in which Justice Field was eating
breakfast. Hill left the room—presumably to gather her pistol from her
chamber—but her husband did not
wait and circled behind Justice Field
and delivered two blows to his head.
Neagle, the marshal, announced his
presence and called on Terry to stop.
Terry made a move as if to draw a
knife that he customarily carried,
and Neagle responded with two
shots from his pistol, killing the
assailant.
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Illustration, San Francisco Examiner, 1888, shows Terry attacking a marshal for removing
Mrs. Terry from the courtroom, U.S. Marshals website, http://www.justice.gov/marshals.

A local constable arrested Neagle on the spot. Ms. Terry, upon her
return to San Francisco, swore out a
complaint for murder against both
Field and Neagle. California authorities then arrested Field who was
released under a bond. An eastern
newspaper reported the following
imaginary dialogue:
Newsboy: “Man tried to kill a judge
in California!”
Customer: “What was done about it?”
Newsboy: “Oh! They arrested the
judge.”

Field immediately filed for a writ
of habeas corpus, and the federal
court within a matter of days granted Justice Field’s writ, ending Justice
Field’s stay at the other end of the
courtroom.

Marshal Neagle was not as fortunate—he unquestionably fired
the shots that killed Terry. He filed
a similar writ of habeas corpus from
a California prison, asserting that
he acted within the line of duty in
protecting Justice Field’s life. He was
moved to San Francisco, but remained
behind bars. He argued that, to the extent his actions were undertaken pursuant to federal authority, his conduct
could only be challenged in federal
court. The federal court eventually
scheduled a hearing, and upheld the
writ, reasoning in part that “upon
general, immutable principles, the
power must be necessarily inherent
in the executive department of any
government worthy of the name of
government, to protect itself in all
matters to which its authority extends; and this necessarily involves
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In re Neagle Supreme Court decision, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), photo by Emily Barney.

the power to protect all the agency
and instrumentalities necessary to
accomplish the objects and purposes
of government.” The Supreme Court
accepted the case for review at California’s request.
On one level, In re Neagle reflects
the generation-old conflict inherent
in our system of federalism. Some
Californians were resentful that the
federal courts did not respect the
state courts’ determination that a
valid marriage had been entered into
between Hill and Sharon. Moreover,
authorities in California were more
than willing to imprison and indict
a U.S. Marshal, even when the Marshal was following presidential orders. Others in California believed
that California courts should be
trusted to determine whether Neagle’s defense was valid without interference from the federal courts.
Whatever one thinks of the resurgent importance of federalism in our

generation—including petitions for
secession filed in the wake of President Obama’s 2012 victory—few
proponents today would be so bold
as to approve of California’s imprisonment of a U.S. Marshal who
unquestionably was acting pursuant to the President’s orders, not to
mention local authorities’ decision
to arrest Justice Field himself. The
story reminds us that, no matter
how intense regional divides may be
today, they pale before the tensions
between states and the federal government over a century ago.
But, the facts underlying the case
reveal more—a sordid tale of love
gone awry, reminiscent of politicians’ struggles more recently, from
Senator Gary Hart’s famed ride on
the aptly named boat “Monkey Business” to President Bill Clinton’s fling
with an intern, and from Wilbur
Mills’ dalliance with the Argentinian
stripper Fanne Foxe to Representa-
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tive Anthony Weiner’s more recent
debacle of sexting. Politicians’ affairs
impact not only political races, but
Supreme Court decisions as well.
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997),
was not the first Supreme Court case
on presidential power sparked by
politicians’ sexual misconduct.

T

he doctrinal legacy of In re
Neagle endures. A divided U.S.
Supreme Court, with Justice Field
recusing himself, held that the President enjoys a residuum of authority
under Article II of the Constitution
to take steps to protect the nation
even if those steps are not spelled out
by Congress. In presaging presidential power debates of the last decade,
the Court concluded that the President could rely on powers not directly rooted in the text of the Constitution in safeguarding the country.
The Court explained, “In the view
we take of the Constitution of the
United States, any obligation fairly and properly inferrible from that
instrument” is appropriate, including the duty to protect a Supreme
Court Justice, even in the absence of
explicit congressional authorization.
The Court continued that “it would
be a great reproach to the system
of government of the United States,
declared to be within its sphere sovereign and supreme, if there is to be
found within the domain of its powers no means of protecting the judges, in the conscientious and faithful
discharge of their duties, from the
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malice and hatred of those upon
whom their judgments may operate
unfavorably.” Presidents can “infer”
powers from the Constitution—including the duty to protect Justices
from harm. In the case, those nonstatutory or “inferrible” powers displaced California’s authority to try
Neagle for murder and provided
Neagle a complete defense to the
charge. Although the accumulation
of powers and responsibilities over
the last 125 years has radically transformed the presidency, the debate
over the scope of presidential powers
under Article II is not new. There is a
residuum of authority under Article
II—even if the extent remains in bitter dispute—permitting presidents
leeway to ensure protection of the
government and the nation itself. ◆
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“First woman jury, Los Angeles,” photo by Bain News Service, 1911, Bain Collection, Library of Congress.

THE CHANGING COMPOSITION
OF THE AMERICAN JURY
Nancy S. Marder

W

hen IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law was
founded 125 years ago,
many of our key legal institutions,
such as the jury, were well established. By 1888, the year of our
school’s founding, the jury was seen
as an institution that provided justice in a nation created by a revolution of “we the people.” Although
it no longer seems remarkable to us
today, the jury system gave ordinary
citizens, untutored in the law, the
power to decide cases and to dispense justice.
Today, reinforced by movies,
television shows, and constant media coverage, the American people

have two deeply-held views about
the jury. The first is that the jury is
meant to represent all of us—“we
the people”—by reflecting our diversity as much as is practical. In
every high-profile jury case, much
attention is paid to the diversity of
the jury. In particular, we care about
race and gender more than almost
any other characteristics. Although
the diversity of the venire is enshrined in several Supreme Court
cases, the diversity of the petit jury
is reinforced by the portrayal of the
jury in popular culture.
The second widely-held view is
that the jury has one job, and that is
to determine the facts. Although a
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jury trial is presided over by a judge
and involves decision-making about
the law, the jury ostensibly plays no
role in determining which laws apply or what standards should be met.
This arrangement seems sensible because the judge and lawyers bring to
the trial legal expertise that the jurors do not have.
While these two views are well
accepted, the students in our first
law class in 1888 would be shocked
to learn what our first-year students
now take for granted. Though our
modern impulse is to assume that
a jury should reflect the diversity
of our community, at one time that
diversity was limited to white men
of property. Our broader understanding of diversity has been the
result of a hard-fought struggle to
extend the rights of jury service to
African-American men and later
to women. This expansion of jury
rights, however, has not been continuous; rather, it has proceeded in fits
and starts. In fact, African-American men in some states in the South
were given the right to serve as jurors
during Reconstruction only to have
that right stripped away by the end
of the 1800s before being restored
decades later. So, too, with women
in the Western territories; they had
the right to serve as jurors in the late
1800s, but it was short-lived.
It will also surprise the modern
reader to discover that the role of the
jury was initially to decide both the
law and the facts. The diminution of
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the role of the jury, so that it decided
only the facts, happened gradually
from about 1850 to the 1930s. Some
researchers believe that as the practice of law became more professional, the distinction widened between
judges and lawyers who knew the
law and ordinary citizens who did
not, until it made little sense for jurors to decide the law.
I offer a more radical theory in
which I see a connection between
the growing diversity of the jury and
the declining power of the jury. My
theory is that the white, male legal
establishment began to curtail the
power of the jury as African-American men and women had the right
to serve on juries. Although African-American men and women lost
that right by the late 1800s, they regained it, albeit after much struggle,
many decades later. For both groups,
however, even when official barriers
were eliminated, other practices kept
them from actually being seated on
juries. Some of these practices, such
as the peremptory challenge, are still
used today in a discriminatory manner, in spite of Supreme Court cases
to the contrary, in an effort to keep
African-American men and women
from being seated on juries.
The Exclusion of African-American
Men from the Jury

A

lbert Alschuler and Andrew
Deiss, in an article entitled A
Brief History of the Criminal Jury in
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the United States, identified 1860 as
the year in which African-American
men first served on a jury. In that
year, two African-American men sat
on a jury in Worcester, Massachusetts. In 1864, Congress passed legislation that allowed African-American men to testify in federal courts,
and this was followed by legislation
that allowed them to testify in state
courts. Jury service was soon to follow.
During Reconstruction (1863–
1877), African-American men served
on juries in some states. For example,
in South Carolina in 1869, the legislature mandated not only the integration of grand and petit juries,
but also that the racial composition
of the jury should approximate that
of the community. Similarly, in New
Orleans between 1872 and 1878,
one-third of the citizens summoned
for jury duty were African-Americans, and this percentage matched
their representation in Orleans
Parish. Between 1870 and 1884 in
Washington County, Texas, where
African-Americans were approximately 50 percent of the population,
they constituted about 30 percent of
those who served on juries. During
the 1870s, in Warren County, Mississippi, African-Americans were
about 35 percent of the grand jurors,
and even though that percentage did
not approximate their percentage in
the community (where they were 70
percent of the community), it was a
significant improvement over their

total exclusion in the past.
Newspapers, in their reporting of
jury trials during this period, noted
when an African-American man
(and they were only men) served as
a juror. On January 15, 1884, in the
Chicago Daily Tribune, one story
questioned whether South Carolina
jurors in a particular case had voted to convict based on their political
parties; it included the following observation: “Three of the jurors, one
a negro and two white men, refused
to find a verdict of guilty.” On February 16, 1885, in the Chicago Daily
Tribune, a story described a murder
trial in New Orleans and mentioned
the sole African-American juror on
this jury: “The only juror who stood
out from the very beginning in favor of conviction was one Edwards,
a negro, and the only negro on the
jury, and he maintained his manly
and honest position to the end, notwithstanding that [the defendant’s]
friends went to his house while he
was serving and threatened his family with violence.”
The newspaper accounts also
noted when the African-American
juror was the first African-American to serve in that locale. A brief
story on May 6, 1891, in the New
York Times announced that a man
named Nelson Stark, described as
“colored,” had been selected as the
eleventh juror in the Garrison murder trial. The story noted that “[it] is
the first time in the history of that
county [in West Virginia] that a col-
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“Negroes as Jurors,” New York Times headline, Nov. 3, 1885.

ored man has sat on an important
case in the State court.” Similarly,
on September 7, 1880, the Chicago
Daily Tribune noted that “[f]or the
first time in the history of Kentucky
the panel of jurymen for the duty
in a criminal court included in the
list of the Louisville Circuit Court
to-day three colored men.” Two of
those men were selected to serve on
a grand jury and the third man was
selected for a petit jury. The article
noted that there were a number of
African-Americans at court that day
and “they evidently took great satisfaction in seeing representatives of
their race assume privileges heretofore denied them.”
The inclusion of African-American men on the jury was not limited
to Southern states. A notice in the
New York Times on November 19,
1890, announced that “[a]mong the
jurors in a case in the Circuit Court
this morning was Abe Peterson, a
Grafton blacksmith, who is the first
colored man to sit on a jury in Renssalaer County[, New York].” On July
9, 1893, a lengthy story in the Chicago Daily Tribune reported that for

the first time in Madison, Wisconsin, an all-African-American jury
(six jurors) heard a civil case involving an assault and battery; the article noted that this jury marked “an
inauguration of a new judicial era.”
Newspaper accounts of jury trials also reported on perceived differences between white jurors and
African-American jurors. According to one story in the Chicago Daily
Tribune on July 10, 1880, “[t]he first
negro juror in Atlanta, the other day,
promptly joined in convicting a negro who was put on trial.” As a result
of African-Americans’ seeming proclivity to convict, “[t]he next prisoner, also a negro, objected to having
one of his own race on the jury.”
Another story, published in the New
York Times on November 3, 1885,
also observed that African-American jurors had been “decidedly
in favor of the Commonwealth as
against colored offenders.” The article suggested that African-American
jurors wanted to show that they were
committed to law and order—so
much so that older lawyers who had
African-American clients would not
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select African-American jurors because “they claim[ed] that colored
jurors are more severe in meting
out punishment to offenders of their
race.”
In spite of constitutional protections provided by the Fourteenth
Amendment (1868) and the Fifteenth
Amendment (1870), statutory protections provided by the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871, the Federal Civil Rights
Act of 1875, and the Federal Jury
Selection Act
of 1879, and a
U.S. Supreme
Court case,
Strauder
v.
West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303
(1880), which
held that a state
statute
disqualifying African-American men
from jury service was unconstitutional, African-American men lost
their place on juries in the South
in the 1890s. Booker T. Washington observed at the end of the
nineteenth century: “In the whole
of Georgia & Alabama, and other
Southern states not a negro juror is
allowed to sit in the jury box in state
courts.” According to a 1910 study,
African-Americans rarely served on
juries in Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, and
Virginia, and they never served on
juries in Alabama and Georgia. In
“Jury of Whites and Blacks,” illustration by James E.
Taylor, 1867, Library of Congress.

sum, according to another commentator, Douglas Colbert, “[a]lthough
it was common for blacks to have
served as jurors during Reconstruction, they virtually disappeared from
the southern jury box by 1900, even
in counties where they constituted
an overwhelming majority of the local population.”
Even though statutes could no
longer prohibit African-American
men from serving on the jury after
Strauder, other
practices kept
them from the
jury box. James
Forman, in Juries and Race
in the Nineteenth Century,
described the
violence directed toward African-Americans
and white Republicans that kept
African-American men in the South
from serving as jurors or witnesses,
or seeking or being afforded the protection of the legal system. All-white
Southern juries failed to convict the
white perpetrators of these crimes.
Non-violent and more subtle
practices also kept African-Americans from actually being seated on
a jury, even if they had been summoned to serve. These practices
ranged from color-coding by race
the names placed in the wheel from
which jurors were selected to the
discretion exercised by white jury
commissioners in selecting only
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white men whom they knew to serve
as jurors. Mississippi’s 1892 law,
which allowed three state officials to
select jurors based on their “good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair
character,” was another way to keep
African-Americans off the jury; other Southern states followed suit.
The practice of discriminatory
peremptory challenges, which continues to this day, was another way
to keep African-Americans from
being selected for petit juries. Each
party could exercise a certain number of peremptories and use them
to remove prospective jurors without giving any reason at all. Parties
used their peremptory challenges to
remove African-Americans from the
jury. Prosecutors, in particular, exercised race-based peremptories to remove African-Americans from the
jury in criminal cases in which the
defendant was African-American.
Even after a number of cases, from
the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, in
which the Supreme Court developed
an elaborate framework to attempt
to counter the exercise of race-based
peremptory challenges, the practice
continues today. Lawyers have simply learned ways to avoid discovery.
In some courts in the South, defense
lawyers in capital cases will not even
challenge the prosecutor’s use of a
race-based peremptory because they
know the judge will never find a peremptory to be discriminatory. The
practice of exercising discriminatory
peremptory challenges persists, even
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though it is undertaken in more subtle ways than it once was.
The Exclusion of Women from the Jury

W

omen’s experience in serving as jurors tracked African-American men’s experience in
some ways, but lagged behind by
many years. Before 1888, women in
at least two Western territories were
permitted to serve as jurors, and in
1898 women in Utah were permitted
to serve as jurors. Wyoming Territory gave women the right to vote and
to sit on juries in 1869, with the first
woman sitting on a jury in Laramie,
Wyoming in 1871. However, there is
some dispute as to when Wyoming
women lost their right to sit on juries. Albert Alschuler and Andrew
Deiss point to 1872 as the year that
“Wyoming’s experiment in equality
in the courtroom” came to an end,
and a New York Times article on November 19, 1883, claimed that “no
woman [in Wyoming] is ever seen
nowadays in the jury box.” However, in an article in the Chicago Daily
Tribune on October 26, 1891, the
first Governor of the State of Wyoming was interviewed and said that
there had been “several women jurors in the courts of Cheyenne, the
Capital of Wyoming.” The Wyoming
Almanac of Politics included an article from the Cheyenne Daily Leader,
dated September 17, 1891, describing a trial in which the defendant
was female as were two of the jurors.
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In 1884, women in Washington Territory had the right to vote and to
serve on juries. However, in 1887,
after a change in personnel on the
Supreme Court of Washington Territory, women lost their right to sit on
juries. In 1898, Utah allowed women
to serve as jurors, and has traditionally been credited as the first state to
do so, though women rarely served
as jurors until the 1930s.
Although there were few women serving as jurors in the 1880s,
there were occasional ruminations
about what women jurors would be
like and what difference they would
make on juries. In a brief note in
the Chicago Daily Tribune on April
21, 1888, entitled Call for Feminine
Jurors, the writer suggested that it is
difficult to convict a female defendant on the West Coast, and perhaps
if women were permitted to serve as
jurors this situation would change.
The writer offered the following recommendation: “It would be a good
thing if the rights of women could
be so extended that in cases where
a woman is accused of crime she
might be tried by a jury of her own
sex.” On June 28, 1893, there was a
brief article in the Chicago Daily
Tribune entitled Women as Jurors,
which raised the question whether Lizzie Borden should have been
tried by a jury that included women
because “a woman on trial for her
life should have the right to demand
an equal representation of women
on the jury.” However, the same ar-

ticle also suggested that whenever
the defendant is a woman, “there
are few men not predisposed to regard the opposite sex with tender
consideration.” In 1893, the Senate
Judiciary Committee held a hearing
to consider a bill that would allow
women to serve as jurors if they “are
wives of men who are duly qualified
so to act,” according to an article in
the New York Times on February 1,
1893. The article reported that Dr.
Mary Walker spoke in support of the
bill, but the bill did not go forward.
Women thought the passage
of the Nineteenth Amendment in
1920, which gave them the right to
vote, would also give them the right
to serve on juries, but this proved
not to be the case in most states. According to Professor Gretchen Ritter,
around the time of the Nineteenth
Amendment, 14 states granted women the right to serve on the jury. In
seven of these states, new laws were
passed that gave women the right to
serve. In the other seven states, jury-qualification statutes described
jurors as “electors,” so once women
became electors under the Nineteenth Amendment, they automatically became eligible to serve as
jurors. However, other states, like
Illinois, rejected this idea. The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that
at the time when the Illinois General
Assembly used the term “electors”
only men could be electors. If women were to be included as “electors,”
then it was up to the Illinois General
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Assembly to say so, which it did,
though not until 1939.
States decided whether to allow
women to serve on juries in their
own courts, and the federal courts
followed the practice of the state in
which the federal court was located.
It was not until the Civil Rights Act
of 1957 that federal courts allowed
women to serve as jurors in federal courts regardless of the practice
of that state’s courts. State courts,
even when they ostensibly permitted
women to serve as jurors, followed
practices that kept many women
from actually serving. In some states,
women had automatic exemptions
from jury duty. In other states, such
as Florida and Louisiana, women
could serve as jurors, but only if they
went down to the courthouse and
affirmatively registered for service,
which was an extra step that men
did not have to take. States that adhered to this practice claimed that it
respected women’s role in the home
and that most women would be unable to serve because of their duties
at home. The effect of affirmative
registration was that very few women registered for jury service. As late
as 1961, this practice was upheld in
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961),
and was not found to be unconstitutional until Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 533 (1975).
Even after the demise of affirmative registration, the exercise of
peremptory challenges was another
way to keep women from serving
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as jurors. Although women were
summoned to serve, they could be
struck from the petit jury by lawyers
exercising gender-based peremptory
challenges. Whereas race-based peremptory challenges were addressed
by the Supreme Court in a series of
cases spanning from the mid-1960s
to the mid-1990s, this line of cases
did not become applicable to gender until J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). Although
there are many reasons that lawyers
defend the peremptory challenge—
from giving defendants control over
jury selection to ridding the jury
of an outlier who could not be dismissed for cause—the peremptory
challenge also should be seen as a
practice that has been, and continues to be, used to keep women and
African-Americans from serving on
juries.
A Decline in Jury Power

B

ack in 1888, when African-American men had for all
intents and purposes lost their right
to serve on juries and the few women in Western territories still had
their short-lived right to serve on
juries, the jury had begun to experience a decline in power. Whereas the
jury—from colonial times until the
1850s—had always had the power to
decide the law and the facts, the jury
started to lose its power to decide
the law and was reduced to deciding
only the facts. This loss came about
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through state court interpretations
of state statutes and constitutions.
This loss could be seen in a number
of states, including Massachusetts
in 1855 and Louisiana in 1871, and
soon spread to other states, including Georgia in 1879 and Vermont in
1892. Today, only two states, Indiana
and Maryland, still instruct jurors
that they have the right to determine
the law as well as the facts. Although
these two states’ constitutions provide for this right, the judiciary in
both states has narrowed this right
through case law.
My own theory is that as African-American men and women
sought to serve on juries, there was
a move on the part of judges to limit
the power of juries. Some commentators suggest that this move came
about because of the growing professionalization of judges. As judges received legal training and saw
themselves as professionals, they
began to see the functions of judges
and juries as distinct, and attempted to limit juries to the fact-finding
function only. Another possibility is
that as the law grew more complex, it
seemed appropriate for professionals
with training and knowledge to decide it, rather than citizens who had
only common sense and experience
to guide them. My own theory is that
the move to limit the function of the
jury to fact-finding came about at a
time when outsiders—women and
African-Americans—were trying to
claim a right to serve as jurors. Al-

though African-American men and
women had not yet been able to secure their right to serve, the writing
was on the wall.
Thus, the late 1880s were a time
of transformation for the jury. Juries
in many states had lost their power
to decide the law, and were officially
limited to finding the facts. It is no
coincidence that this occurred at a
time when African-American men
and women had experienced the
right to serve as jurors, albeit briefly, and sought to recover that right,
even though it would take them
many years to do so. ◆
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Gideon v. Wainright Supreme Court decision, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
THE SUPREME COURT: THEN AND NOW
David S. Rudstein

A

fter examining the United States Reports containing the cases decided by the
Supreme Court during its 1887–88
term, one might conclude that the
United States in the late 1880s was
a law-abiding country with little
crime. Of the approximately 270 cases decided by the Court during that
term, only seven (2.6 percent) raised
issues of criminal law or procedure.
In contrast, in its most recently completed term, 2011–12, the Supreme
Court decided 76 cases, 22 (29 percent) of which involved issues of
criminal law or procedure.
What accounts for this dramatic
rise in the number (and percentage)

of criminal law or procedure cases
decided by the Supreme Court? No
one would deny that crime in the
United States has increased since
1888. But the true explanation for
the increased number of criminal
law and procedure cases decided by
the Supreme Court is the “constitutionalization” of criminal procedure.
When originally adopted in 1791,
the Bill of Rights (the first eight
amendments to the U.S. Constitution) placed limitations only upon
the Federal Government, not upon
the individual States. Consequently,
none of the rights provided in those
amendments—such as the protection against unreasonable searches
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and seizures (Fourth Amendment),
the guarantee against double jeopardy (Fifth Amendment), the privilege against self-incrimination (Fifth
Amendment), the right to counsel
(Sixth Amendment), the right to a
jury trial (Sixth Amendment), and
the right to confront hostile witnesses (Sixth Amendment)—applied in
criminal prosecutions brought in
state courts. Hence, an individual
convicted of a crime in a state court
could not challenge his or her conviction in the U.S. Supreme Court on
the ground that he or she had been
denied a right guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights. Many states did of course
have their own constitutional provisions guaranteeing various rights
to those accused of crime in their
own courts, but each state could interpret its own constitutional provisions, and many of these provisions
turned out to be less protective of
individual rights than their federal
counterparts. Moreover, since these
were rights guaranteed by state law,
rather than federal law, their alleged
violation did not raise a federal issue
that could be adjudicated by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Even in 1888, after the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment—
which, among other things, prohibits
a State from abridging the “privileges and immunities” of United States
citizens (“Privileges and Immunities
Clause”) and from “depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law” (“Due
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Process Clause”)—the Bill of Rights
still provided no protection to state
criminal defendants.
Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
recognized that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected some individual
rights from state infringement, including, perhaps, some safeguarded
by the Bill of Rights against National
action. Nevertheless, the Court expressly stated that if the Due Process
Clause protected such latter rights, it
was not because they were enumerated in the first eight amendments.
It explained that the Due Process
Clause protected only those rights
that are “the very essence of a scheme
of ordered liberty” and essential to “a
fair and enlightened system of justice.” In determining whether a particular safeguard met this standard,
the Court asked whether “a civilized system could be imagined that
would not accord the particular protection.” Applying this test, the Supreme Court held that several of the
protections contained in the Bill of
Rights, including the privilege against
self-incrimination and the right to a
grand jury indictment, did not apply
to the States. Even when the Court
held that a particular right enumerated
in the Bill of Rights fell within the
concept of due process, it frequently
concluded that the protection afforded against state infringement was less
than that afforded against infringement by the Federal Government—a
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prosecution’s case. The Connecticut
Supreme Court agreed; it reversed
the conviction (and life sentence)
and, despite Palko’s implicit acquittal
for that offense, ordered a new trial
for first-degree murder. At the second trial, a jury convicted Palko of
first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to death—a conviction and
sentence that the Supreme Court ultimately upheld against a claim that
Palko’s second trial had placed him
twice in jeopardy for first-degree
murder.
“watered-down” version of the right.
To illustrate, although the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against
double jeopardy precluded the
Government in a federal criminal
prosecution from appealing a jury
verdict—whether a conviction or
an acquittal—that protection did
not apply in state court proceedings.
Consequently, in the mid-1930s,
after a Connecticut jury considering a charge of first-degree murder
against Frank Palko convicted him
of second-degree murder (thereby
implicitly acquitting him of the original charge of first-degree murder),
the State, acting pursuant to a state
statute, sought review of the conviction. The State claimed the trial
judge had erred in instructing the
jury on first-degree murder and in
excluding certain evidence from the
Photo of Clarence Earl Gideon, 1961(?), State Archives of Florida, Florida Memory, RC12789.

T

hroughout the 1940s and 1950s,
the Supreme Court consistently
rejected the view, persuasively argued by Justice Hugo L. Black, that
the Fourteenth Amendment had “incorporated” the entire Bill of Rights
and made its provisions applicable to
the States to the same extent as they
applied to the Federal Government.
Even as late as 1961, despite the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that
an accused in a criminal prosecution “shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense,” an indigent being tried in
a state court for a non-capital felony
had no federal constitutional right to
have counsel appointed to represent
him or her. Thus, when Clarence
Earl Gideon, an indigent drifter being tried in a Florida state court for
breaking and entering a poolroom,
requested the trial court to appoint
counsel to represent him, the judge
could respond:
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Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent
you in this case. Under the laws of
the State of Florida, the only time
the Court can appoint Counsel to
represent a Defendant is when that
person is charged with a capital offense. I am sorry, but I will have
to deny your request to appoint
Counsel to defend you in this case.

During the 1960s, however, under the leadership of Chief Justice
Earl Warren, the Supreme Court
adopted the position that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment “selectively incorporated” various provisions of the Bill of
Rights and made them applicable to
the States. Using this approach, the
Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy, the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial, and, in overturning Clarence
Earl Gideon’s conviction, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel were
among the rights safeguarded from
infringement by the states. In 1968,
the Court explained that it had reformulated its test for determining
whether a particular provision of
the Bill of Rights was incorporated
by the Fourteenth Amendment. It
stated:
The recent cases . . . have proceeded upon the valid assumption that state criminal processes
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are not imaginary and theoretical
schemes but actual systems bearing
virtually every characteristic of the
common-law system that has been
developing virtually contemporaneously in England and in this country.
The question thus is whether given
this kind of system a particular procedure is fundamental—whether,
that is, a procedure is necessary to
an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty. [Emphasis added.]

Today, virtually all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights safeguarding the rights of a criminal defendant apply to the States (the lone
exception being the right to an indictment). As a result, the Supreme
Court each term receives hundreds
of petitions requesting it to review
a state-court conviction alleged to
have been obtained in violation of
the defendant’s federal constitutional
rights, and each year the Court decides 20 or so cases involving such
issues, a large percentage of the
number of cases it decides each term
with written opinions. ◆
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Dean from 1983 to 1987. He has focused
his scholarship on criminal procedure.

80

Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress

“Our overworked Supreme Court,” Puck cartoon by Joseph Keppler, 1885, Library of Congress.

A “PROGRESSIVE CONTRACTION OF JURISDICTION”:
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT
Carolyn Shapiro

T

he Supreme Court in 1888
was in crisis. Its structure
and responsibilities, created
a century earlier by the Judiciary Act
of 1789, were no longer adequate or
appropriate. The Court was overwhelmed by its docket, and the justices’ responsibilities, which included
circuit riding, were impossible to
meet. Shaped as it was by a law almost as old as the country itself, the
Supreme Court in 1888—and the
federal judicial system as a whole—
would be barely recognizable to
many today.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established not only the Supreme Court,
but also the entire federal court

system. The Act divided the country initially into thirteen districts,
which were in turn combined into
three circuits. Unlike today’s circuit
courts, however, the circuit courts
created in 1789 had original jurisdiction over certain types of cases and
provided appellate review of only
a few cases heard originally in the
district courts. In addition, the Judiciary Act provided for district court
judges and Supreme Court justices,
but no circuit court judges. Instead,
twice a year, two Supreme Court justices would visit each district and,
along with one district court judge,
would sit as the circuit court. There
were six Supreme Court justices, so

Carolyn Shapiro

that two could be assigned to each
circuit. Even after 1793, when subsequent laws provided that only
one Supreme Court justice at a time
would sit on a circuit courts, meaning that each justice had to make
the trip only once a year rather than
twice, an enormous portion of Supreme Court justices’ time, was
spent riding circuit—at a time when
travel was slow and difficult. And as
the country grew, more circuits were
created.
Not only did Supreme Court justices ride circuit, but the Supreme
Court itself had no discretion over
its docket. Cases were appealed to
the Supreme Court as of right, unlike
today. This lack of control turned out
to be extremely problematic. During
the first century of its existence, not
only did the United States become
geographically larger and more populous, but industry grew, the country’s economy became increasingly
sophisticated, and new laws and
sources of litigation abounded, especially after the Civil War. As a result,
the Supreme Court’s docket grew
dramatically. At the beginning of the
1888 Term, there were 1,563 cases on
the docket. The Court simply could
not keep up. As Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis described
the situation: “The Supreme Court
docket became a record of arrears.”
Less poetically, it took three years for
a case to be heard. The situation was
untenable.
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Faced with overwhelming caseloads, by 1888 the Supreme Court
had already attempted to adjust its
standard of review in order to dissuade lawyers and litigants from
appealing fact-intensive cases with
few implications beyond the particular parties. In Newell v. Norton and
Ship, an 1865 admiralty case involving a steamboat collision, for example, the Court summarily affirmed
the verdict for the plaintiff, holding
that there was “ample testimony to
support the decision.” The Court explained that it would not engage in
a searching review of the lengthy record, which included more than 100
depositions:
Parties ought not to expect this court
to revise their decrees merely on a
doubt raised in our minds as to the
correctness of their judgment, on
the credibility of witnesses, or the
weight of conflicting testimony.

The Court’s reluctance to engage
in error correction, even at a time when
it had no formal control of its docket,
continues to this day. Today, Supreme
Court Rule 10, Considerations Governing Review on Writ of Certioari,
explains that a “petition for a writ of
certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of erroneous
factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”
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D

espite the Court’s effort to define
a very narrow scope of review, it
was unable to halt the flood of cases
coming to it. Facing both its own
swelling docket and the geographic
expansion of the country, the justices found circuit riding to be increasingly difficult and they often
simply did not do it. As Frankfurter
and Landis explain, “[B]y 1890 the
statutory duty of the Justices to attend circuit was practically a dead
letter.”
And it was not the Supreme
Court alone that was unable to function properly. Despite some earlier
attempts to expand and reform the
lower courts, there were still not
nearly enough judges. Circuit courts,
which were supposed to sit with two
judges, often had to function with
only one. Even more problematic,
that single judge was often a district
court judge who was hearing appeals
of his own decisions. In 1889, a paper presented at the Annual Meeting
of the American Bar Association put
it this way:
Such an appeal is not from Philip
drunk to Philip sober, but from
Philip sober to Philip intoxicated
with the vanity of a matured opinion and doubtless also a published
decision.

This arrangement could not possibly
inspire confidence in an impartial
and fair justice system.
Congress finally acted in 1891,

after many years of considering and
rejecting proposals for major reform,
and the federal judicial system we
know today began to emerge. Most
significantly, Congress established
intermediate appellate courts for the
first time. If litigants were required
to appeal first to those intermediate
courts, the hope was, many fewer of
them would subsequently take their
cases to the Supreme Court. The law
indeed appeared to lessen the tide of
cases, at least at first. During 1890,
before passage, 623 new cases were
docketed at the Supreme Court. In
1892, the number dropped by more
than half, to 275.
The 1891 law, known as the Evarts
Act, also contained the seeds of today’s Court’s largely discretionary
jurisdiction. For the first time, Congress created a category of cases that
the Supreme Court would review
only upon certification, or certiorari,
although most cases continued to
flow to the Court as a matter of right.
The Supreme Court embraced
the opportunity to limit the number
of cases coming before it. During
the first two years after passage of
the 1891 act, it granted certiorari
in only two cases. While careful to
maintain its power to grant certiorari in any case pending in the courts
of appeals, the Court was, quite
deliberately, “chary of action in respect to certiorari,” as it explained
in Forsyth v. City of Hammond, decided in 1897. In Forsyth, the Court
announced narrow criteria for when
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“The Supreme Court/Men Who Know the Law,” October Term, 1895. Designed by the American Lithographic Co.,
1896, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States.

certiorari would be appropriate:
[The certiorari] power will be
sparingly exercised, and only when
the circumstances of the case satisfy us that the importance of the
question involved, the necessity of
avoiding conflict between two or
more courts of appeal, or between
courts of appeal and the courts of a
state, or some matter affecting the
interests of this nation in its internal or external relations, demands
such exercise.

These criteria remain, largely unchanged, the stated criteria for certiorari today as set forth in Supreme
Court Rule 10.
The Evarts Act, however, was
not successful in its goal of cutting
the Court’s workload to a manageable size. It did not eliminate most

of the Court’s mandatory appellate
jurisdiction. The hope that the creation of the intermediate appellate
courts would satisfy litigants’ need
for appellate review, thereby making
an appeal to the Supreme Court less
attractive, proved largely illusory.
(Lawyers and litigants often apparently used the right of an appeal to
the Supreme Court simply as a delaying tactic, a possibility that seems
entirely obvious to a modern legal
audience.) In the years following the
enactment of the Evarts Act, the Supreme Court’s caseloads increased
again to unmanageable proportions,
as the nation, its economy, and its
judicial business continued to grow.
Moreover, even after 1891 and despite the concern for the Supreme
Court’s caseload that inspired the
Evarts Act, Congress continued to
create even more categories of man-
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datory appeals to the Court. In 1903,
for example, it passed the Expediting
Act, which created the three-judge
district court to hear certain antitrust cases. Appeals from this type
of district court went directly to the
Supreme Court as of right. And over
the following 10 to 15 years, Congress provided that more and more
types of cases follow this procedure.
(A handful of cases, such as constitutional challenges to congressional
districts, are subject to this procedure even today.)
Although it expanded the Court’s
mandatory jurisdiction in some areas, Congress did cut back on it in
others. In 1916, for example, Congress eliminated mandatory jurisdiction over Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases, as well as certain
cases arising out of state courts, cases from the Philippines, and cases
arising under certain other federal
statutes. The most significant overhaul of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, however, was the 1925 Judges’
Bill—so called because it was drafted
by members of the Supreme Court
itself. The Act dramatically expanded the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction,
leaving only a few, relatively small
categories of cases for mandatory
appeals.
The goal of the Judges’ Bill, like
the Evarts Act, was to free the Court
from having to decide cases that were
not important to anyone beyond
the immediate parties involved and
to allow it to focus on more nation-

ally significant matters. The House
Committee report on the Judges’ Bill
explained:
The problem is whether the time
and attention and energy of the
court shall be devoted to matters
of large public concern, or whether
they shall be consumed by matters
of less concern, without especial
general interest, and only because
the litigant wants to have the court
of last resort pass upon his right.

In a 1925 Yale Law Review article,
Chief Justice William Howard Taft
provided more detail about what
sorts of cases he believed the Court
should take on certiorari after passage of the Judges’ Bill, reiterating
the criteria the Court first articulated in the 1890s—and that today are
embodied in Rule 10:
The function of the Supreme
Court is conceived to be . . . the
consideration of cases whose decision involves principles, the application of which are of wide public or governmental interest, and
which should be authoritatively
declared by the final court. Such
cases should include issues of the
Federal constitutional validity of
statutes, Federal and State, genuine
issues of constitutional rights of
individuals, the interpretation of
Federal statutes when it will affect
large classes of people, questions
of Federal jurisdiction, and some-
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times doubtful questions of general law of such wide application
that the Supreme Court may help
remove the doubt. Where there
is a conflict of opinion between
intermediate appellate courts in
the different Circuits or between
the Federal intermediate appellate
courts and the Supreme Courts of
the States, the public interest certainly requires that the Supreme
Court hear the cases, if its decision
will remove the conflict.

The Judges’ Bill did not completely eliminate caseload pressures,
of course. Petitions for certiorari alone
topped 5,000 a year by the early 1980s.
In October Term 2011, the Court considered more than 7,500 petitions,
although this number represents a
modest decrease from prior years.
Despite these massive numbers,
however, the Court has not fallen
behind in dealing with these filings.
Instead, it has adopted a variety
of ways of dealing with them efficiently—from eliminating the need
to discuss a petition in the justices’
conference unless at least one justice
wants to consider it, to relying on
law clerks to read the petitions and
summarize them in brief memos.
This latter mechanism relies heavily on the “cert pool”—a cooperative
agreement among most of the justices (currently, all but Justice Alito)
in which the petitions are divided
among the chambers and each petition
is assigned to a single law clerk. The
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cert pool was introduced in the 1970s.
For cases decided on the merits,
however, the Court continued to
feel greatly burdened by its workload in the mid- to late twentieth
century, even as the number of merits
cases shrank. In the 1980s, the Court
heard argument and issued written
opinions in approximately 150 cases
a year. Many observers, and some of
the justices themselves, believed that
150 cases were simply too many for
the Court to handle well. Moreover,
these people argued, the Court was
unable to give truly important cases
the time and attention they needed
in part because of the need to manage the mandatory appeals, which
were often not of interest beyond the
parties themselves. There was much
discussion of some kind of national
court of appeals or other panel to
assist the Supreme Court with the
more mundane cases. Then-Justice
William H. Rehnquist explained at
his 1986 confirmation hearings to be
Chief Justice:
I think if Congress could be persuaded, not ultimately but very
presently, there ought to be a
new national court, frankly
recognized as such, with judges
appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, who
would act as something of a junior
chamber of the Supreme Court,
to hear primarily statutory cases
about which there are presently
conflicts in the circuit[s].
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Photo of Supreme Court Room (in the Capitol), c. 1894, Wittemann Collection, Library of Congress.

A

s we all know, no such dramatic
change occurred. During the
1970s, Congress eliminated mandatory jurisdiction in a number
of types of cases and in 1988, once
again at the justices’ urging, it eliminated almost all of the remaining
direct appeals to the Supreme Court.
The Court, freed from mandatory
appeals and aggressively applying its
certiorari criteria, has been hearing
argument in fewer and fewer cases
a year. In October Term 2011, for
example, the number of cases decided after briefing and oral argument
reached the historic low of 65 cases.
Not only do these numbers place
the Supreme Court caseload at historic lows, but, as Judge Richard A.
Posner has pointed out, when measured as a proportion of all cases in
the federal judicial system, the case-

load is vanishingly small. He “compare[s] the percentage just of federal court cases in which the Court
granted certiorari in 2004—0.11%
(64 divided by 56,396)—with the
corresponding percentage in 1960—
1.6% (60 divided by 3753)” to find
that “the Court reviewed, in relative
terms, almost 15 times as many federal court cases in 1960 as in 2004.”
Put another way, what Frankfurter
and Landis said in 1928 remains just
as true today:
Perhaps the decisive factor in the
history of the Supreme Court
is its progressive contraction of
jurisdiction. . . . In contrast with
the vast expansion of the bounds
of the inferior federal courts, the
scope of review by the Supreme
Court has been steadily narrowed.
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This “progressive contraction,”
both of mandatory jurisdiction and
of the Court’s exercise of its own discretion to hear cases, has reached a
point where the concerns expressed
today about the Supreme Court’s
workload are unprecedented. Commentators and observers today complain that the Court is not taking
enough cases and that the justices
do not work hard enough. In stark
contrast to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
statements at his confirmation hearings, then-Judge John G. Roberts indicated at his hearings in 2005 that
he thought there was “room for the
Court to take more cases.” Nonetheless, since his confirmation, the
Court has not in fact done so. As already noted, the Court decided only
65 cases after briefing and argument
in October Term 2011. Whether
and how Congress—or the Court itself—will ultimately respond to such
complaints and observations, and
what the next 125 years will bring,
remains to be seen. ◆
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Photo of Law Library of the Library of Congress in the U.S. Capitol, c. 1895, Library of Congress.

125 YEARS OF LAW BOOKS, 1888–2013
Keith Ann Stiverson
To attain a competent knowledge of the common law . . .
requires steady perseverance, in consequence of the number of
books which beset and encumber the path of the student.

J

					—James Kent

ames Kent wrote those words in
1826, decrying the fact that more
than 600 volumes of English and
American case reports and treatises
had been published, but not many
of them were helpful to the student
seeking an understanding of the
common law. “Steady perseverance,”
to Chancellor Kent, meant setting
aside more books than were consulted,
to take control of the “indigestible
heap of . . . legal authorities.”

The early classes at Chicago-Kent
College of Law were taught in judges’
chambers or in law offices, where
the library usually belonged to the
instructor. Students were often free
to use the books, and sometimes
could borrow them for short periods
of time. The trouble was, everyone
needed the same books. The problem was underscored when Dean
Langdell’s case method became the
dominant means of instruction.
Many volumes of case reports had to
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be replaced year after year, because
the pages where the assigned cases
appeared were simply thumbed to
death by students: the casebook was
born of necessity as much as convenience.
The nineteenth century law
schools that merged to become Chicago-Kent College of Law had very
small collections of books, but students had access to both the city’s
public library (founded in 1872) and
the Newberry Library, a humanities research collection open to the
public that was established in 1887.
The only Chicago law library of any
size was the Chicago Law Institute
Library, which was incorporated by
a small group of lawyers in 1857 to
serve the needs of the city’s growing legal community. The collection
consisted of approximately 7,000
volumes and was housed in the
Cook County Courthouse, where
judges, government employees, and
law students were permitted to use
the collection at no charge, while local practitioners paid an annual fee
of $100. The Law Institute collection
eventually served as the basis for the
Cook County Law Library, which is
now estimated to have more than
300,000 volumes.
Law book publishing in the nineteenth century was initially based
in Albany, New York City, Philadelphia, and Boston, but Chicago also
had a share of the industry, including E.B. Myers & Co., a book store/
office for Lawyers Co-operative
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Publishing Company of New York,
and the Illinois Book Exchange,
which provided student textbooks.
The most famous law book store of
all was “Callaghan’s Three Miles of
Law Books” at 68 West Washington Street, which eventually became
“Miles and Miles of Law Books” in
later advertisements when its stock
was replaced after the Great Chicago
Fire of 1871. Law books were often
distributed through the publishers’
own book stores, but Callaghan sold
books from many publishers.
It was in the 1880s that American
law publishers began to create order
out of the “indigestible heap” of law
books that was growing very fast
as the nation and commerce developed. By then, case reports had been
published in the United States for
approximately 100 years, but not in a
systematic way until West’s National
Reporter System began in 1879 with
the Northwestern Reporter. West
was the company that established a
real system for publishing cases, and
then followed that innovation with
the American Digest System. Soon
after the Northwestern Reporter began, West took over and improved
the U.S. Digest, which was previously
published by Little, Brown. West’s
digests and Key Number System
enabled lawyers to find what they
needed in the rapidly-growing sets
of West reporters. The company then
answered the needs of lawyers who
could not afford (and did not want)
the entire national system when it
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began publishing state digests and
reporters.
As West was inventing a system to grapple with the burgeoning case law, Frank Shepard was
inventing the case citator. Shepard’s
Citations began in 1873 as a service
in which adhesive labels were sent
to subscribers who affixed them to
the pages of published case reports
so that the lawyer reading the case
could determine whether the court’s
decision in the case was still “good
law” or had been overturned on appeal. Eventually Shepard developed
a complicated system of abbreviations to indicate the importance and
validity of the case so that a reader
knew if the case could be cited as authority for the statement he wanted
to make. The awkward method of
updating (the gummed labels often
dried up and fell off the pages) didn’t
work very well, so Shepard began
publishing his updating system in
bound volumes keyed to the various
reporters and updated by paperback
supplements. The lawyer who needed
to determine the history or current
status of a case he was reading could
simply check by citation. Finally, in
the 1980s, the Shepard’s Citations
system became the extremely current online citator that lawyers use
today.
One response to the proliferation
of cases was the birth of selective
case reporters with so-called annotations, i.e., an explanation that put
the case(s) in context and provided a

narrative to explain the development
of a particular area of law. It was simply impossible for most lawyers to
keep up with the massive number of
court opinions being published, so
the idea of highlighting and explaining only the leading cases had real
merit. The earliest of the annotated
cases, in the 1880s, were accompanied by short notes; later on, editors
wrote hundreds of pages to explain
the development and current state
of an area of law in multiple jurisdictions.
Another innovation that came
from the law book publishers soon
after the turn of the century was the
specialized loose-leaf service. The
first successful one was published by
Commerce Clearing House in 1913
after ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment created the income
tax. Soon there were other services
covering such subjects as trade regulation and banking, then additional
areas of law as more publishers entered the field. The most useful of the
loose-leaf services brought together in
one publication all of the things that a
practitioner needed: court opinions,
rulings, statutes and regulations, as
well as secondary commentary. Many
of the services were updated weekly,
so the lawyer had less reason to worry
that the information he had was out of
date. In the 1980s, many lawyers who
specialized in a particular area of law
welcomed the new CD-ROM format,
which made it easy for them to carry
around their entire law library.
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Judges were not the only busy
writers; legislatures, both state and
federal, began to pass more laws to
deal with the demands of an increasingly complex industrial society. Session laws were often published only
at the end of a session of the legislature; these, along with the occasional
statutory digest and the various indexes, were not sufficient to make
the material available in a timely
manner. It was increasingly difficult
to piece together the original statute
with all of the amendments of later
years. The Revised Statutes of 1873
was a temporary solution to the
problem, but it was 1926 before the
first publication of the United States
Code. The Code finally gave lawyers
access to federal law in a topical arrangement that was updated. The
official Code is republished every
six years; the most recent edition
consists of more than 200,000 pages.
West began publishing an unofficial
version of the Code right away, in
1927, called the United States Code
Annotated. As everyone knows who
has done research in federal statutes,
West did a faster, better job than the
government of publishing the supplementation necessary to keep the
Code up to date. Many states also
began to compile their statutes into
a topical arrangement with an extensive index. Some of these compilations provided citations to cases
or short annotations of the court
decisions that had construed each
section of the statute.
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No law library could afford to
collect all of the official statutes and
court opinions of Federal and state
governments, let alone the commercial versions of primary material. The
huge wave of secondary legal publications that appeared in response
to the New Deal and the eventual
specialization of the legal profession
made it impossible to build a truly
comprehensive collection. The 600
volumes of case reports that once
annoyed Chancellor Kent continued to multiply until it eventually
became the behemoth that also included thousands of law reviews and
legal newspapers. Luckily, the technology we needed and the uniform
system of legal citation made it possible to control this enormous mass
of material, and to simplify the many
elaborate systems that had been created to help the practitioner find the
law by subject.
The 1970s and 1980s were decades of real achievement in making the whole body of law and the
many secondary sources more readily available in convenient form.
The Lexis database was followed
eventually by Westlaw, and the two
systems have dominated the market
for online legal research ever since,
despite weak challenges from smaller publishers and from the open access movement. The recent entry of
Bloomberg Law/BNA into the online
market is the first real challenge to
the supremacy of Lexis and Westlaw.
A collection of historical books
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Class poem from The Transcript, 1920, Chicago-Kent’s student yearbook, photo by Emily Barney.

named The Making of Modern Law
(MOML) was an important contribution to law collections several
years ago that helped to level the field
for new academic law libraries that
had few of the older books. MOML
is a digital collection of more than
twenty thousand nineteenth and
early twentieth century treatises and
other legal documents that are accessible through Chicago-Kent Library’s
online catalog. As one flips through
the pages of this electronic book collection, it is somewhat surprising to
realize that quite often one is looking
at images of a print work that was
once prized by our nineteenth century faculty and students. An example
is Thayer’s A Preliminary Treatise on
Evidence at the Common Law, published at the turn of the last century
and later added to our library’s print

collection as the 10,510th volume, a
work that is still available on a shelf
in the library, but also accessible as
a full-text e-book that can be read
24/7 by clicking a hyperlink.

N

ow that our huge collections of
print volumes are disappearing
from shelves, what will happen next
to the academic law book collections
that took more than a century to
acquire? One can probably predict
more offsite storage, more e-books,
and more use of print-on-demand
options. What was once known as
“collection development” in the library has undergone radical change.
Acquisition is often temporary, and
research materials are not automatically added to the library’s permanent collection.

Keith Ann Stiverson

Many law libraries are returning
to their roots to make the historical
materials of their law schools available. For instance, Chicago-Kent
Library is starting a project to preserve the law school’s unique historical collections by placing them
in a digital repository. The images
will reside in the cloud, rather than
moldering away, page by page, in a
dark room. The institutional repository will be the permanent home for
(among other things) the early publications and videos of and about the
law school. We will be able to tell the
descendant of a 1915 graduate where
to find the online class photograph
that includes his great-grandfather.
The nephew of a woman who was
the class poet many years ago can
now read her work online, because
we saved on old student yearbook
before it disintegrated.
Today’s law student may finish
her legal education and then go into
the practice of law without ever using
a print volume, given the twenty-first
century reality that online databases
usually contain everything she needs
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for research, and client files are often
in an electronic knowledge management system rather than in a print
file. But if she returns for a law school
class reunion in a few years, hoping
to re-live her triumph at a law student talent show, we hope we’ll have
a link to the video. ◆
Sources and Further Reading

■ James R. Grossman, et al., eds., The Encyclopedia
of Chicago (2004).
■ Historical Development of the American Lawyer’s
Library, 61 Law Libr. J. 440–462 (1968).
■ Chicago-Kent College of Law, The Transcript
(student yearbook), 1917–.
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Photo of Grand Pacific Hotel, LaSalle St. and Jackson Blvd., site of the Illinois Supreme Court chambers of
Justice Joseph M. Bailey, where Chicago College of Law classes met, 1887–1889.

CHICAGO-KENT:
125 YEARS AND COUNTING
Ralph L. Brill
I. The First 100 Years
A. The Early Years

A

t the end of the nineteenth
century, the major method by which one became
a lawyer was through self-study
under the supervision of a practicing lawyer—an apprenticeship.
Few law schools or even university
law departments existed. In 1774,
Judge Tapping Reeve of Connecticut established the first law school,
Litchfield. Over the next 58 years,
Reeve and his partner James Gould
lectured on all areas of the law to

over one thousand student-apprentices. Graduates included two Vice
Presidents of the United States, 101
members of the United States House
of Representatives, 28 United States
senators, three justices of the United
States Supreme Court, 14 state governors and 13 state Supreme Court
chief justices. In 1779, Thomas Jefferson established a “chair in law” at
William and Mary. George Wythe
was appointed to the position, and
gave lectures on various law subjects
as part of the university’s multifarious curriculum. Harvard, Pennsylvania, Maryland and other schools
later added actual law departments;
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their graduates were awarded bachelor degrees. Most schools offered
a curriculum similar to Litchfield’s:
lectures on Domestic Relations, Executors and Administrators, Sheriffs
and Gaolers, Contracts and Actions,
Torts, Evidence, Pleading and Practice, The Law Merchant, Equity,
Criminal Law, and Real Property.
Apprenticeship remained the major
means to becoming a lawyer.
As interest in law training increased, lawyer/mentors tended to
overwork their apprentices with
work growing out of their practices,
leaving little time for the would-be
lawyers to study on their own. Also,
the significant increase in immigrants furnished a large audience
eager to enter a profession in their
new country. Thus, a number of evening law programs began, enabling
those interested in keeping their jobs
while preparing for careers in law. In
Chicago, the first of these was Union
College of Law, begun in 1859. It was
founded and maintained through a
loose association of Northwestern
University and Chicago University.
The Chicago University was not The
University of Chicago, which was
founded years later in 1890. Chicago
University went defunct about 1871,
at which time Northwestern completely took over the Union College
of Law.
In 1887, four young clerks at
the law firm of Burke, Hollett and
Tinsman—Kickham Scanlon, Louis
Henry, Rudolph Frankenstein, and
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Joseph Grannick—asked Mr. Burke
for advice on how they could obtain
mentoring after work as they studied for possible admission to the bar.
Mr. Burke recommended they talk
with Justice Thomas A. Moran of the
Illinois Appellate Court. Moran was
intrigued with the idea but at that
time believed he was too busy. He in
turn recommended they speak with
Justice Joseph Meade Bailey, then
of the Appellate Court and soon to
be elevated to the Illinois Supreme
Court. Justice Bailey agreed to meet
with the group from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m.
three nights a week in what they informally called “The Evening Law Class.”
The group met in Justice Bailey’s
chambers at the Court, located in the
Grand Pacific Hotel, at LaSalle and
Jackson. As word of the class spread,
other apprentices throughout the
city requested to be allowed to sit in
on the class. In 1888, the class was
formalized and Justice Bailey incorporated it as Chicago College of Law,
with himself as dean and president.
Bailey induced Justice Moran and
Appellate Court Judge Shepard to join
him as teachers, enabling them to split
the evenings and have classes Monday
through Saturday.
Classes were spread over two
years, and labeled the Junior and
Senior Classes. The Junior classes
were held on Monday, Wednesday
and Friday, from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m.,
and the Senior classes were held on
Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday. Tuition was set at $5 per month, pay-
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able three months in advance. The
judges’ lectures were supplemented for the Junior Class by readings
from law books, including Blackstone’s Commentaries, Kent’s Commentaries, Bishop on Contracts,
Walker’s American Law, and Morey’s
Elements of Roman Law. The Senior
Class was assigned readings from
more advanced legal texts including, Bishpam’s Principles of Equity,
Gould on Pleading, Taylor on Corporations, and Langdell on Equity
Pleadings. Completion of the twoyear program enabled graduates to
be eligible for admission to the bar,
upon proper motion by an existing
member of the bar.
Students could be admitted without having attended college or finishing high school. Students who
lacked a high school diploma could
be admitted by showing that they
had a “good common school education” and could pass a test on the
branches of learning commonly
taught in high school. Many other
schools in the country did not admit
women or persons of color. In contrast, the Chicago College of Law catalogue emphasized that “no distinction will be made in the admission of
students on account of sex or color.”
Thus, among the students in the early
classes were several women and students of color. Ms. Emma Bauman
was in the very first class and was
admitted to practice in 1890. Ms.
Ida Platt, Class of 1894, was the first
African-American woman admitted

to practice in Illinois. Twenty of the
first one hundred women admitted
to practice in Illinois were graduates
of the school.
Things moved quite quickly in
the first few years. The rapid increase
in enrollment led Justice Bailey to
move the classes to the Appellate
Court rooms at the Chicago Opera House Building, on Clark near
Washington. In 1889, the Chicago
College of Law merged with Lake
Forest University, which was seeking
to become a full-fledged university
with affiliated medical, dental and
seminary schools. In addition, because so many lawyers had already
been admitted to practice, based
only on their home-study, the Chicago College of Law established a
post-graduate program to help them
measure up to the demands of the
profession. The graduate program
consisted of one year of practice-oriented courses, two nights per week
for eight months, with tuition of $40
per year. Further help was offered
through a summer school, with
classes on drafting pleadings and
contracts, for a fee of $12. Completion of the full three-year program
earned graduates a Bachelor of Laws
degree and automatic admission to
the bar.
The success of the College is
shown by the fact that over the first
six years of its existence, 766 students
graduated from the two-year undergraduate program, and 290 lawyers
from the graduate program. In 1892,
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the ever increasing size of the classes caused the College to move once
again, this time to the Atheneaum
Building, located on Van Buren near
Michigan.
Justice Bailey passed away in
1896. Judge Moran took over as dean
and president. Judged by modern
standards, the law school was literally an undergraduate college, with
very young students. It was thus natural that the typical college organizations formed, including fraternities and sororities, clubs of all kinds,
a school newspaper, and a combination catalog/yearbook/law review,
The Athenaeum Journal.
Meanwhile, in 1891, Northwestern took full control of the Union
College of Law, and renamed it
Northwestern Law School. Marshall
Ewell, one of Union College’s leading professors, was unhappy with
the shift in teaching philosophy and
pedagogy that was put into effect at
Northwestern. He believed that by
eliminating many practical courses
from its curriculum, Northwestern
had lost sight of the fact that the law
school was supposed to be training
students for the practice of law. In
1892, he and several other faculty
members resigned and formed a new
school, Kent School of Law. Within a
year the name changed to Kent College of Law. Forty-two Northwestern
students followed Ewell to Kent. The
initial classes were held at the Briggs
Painting of Justice Joseph Meade Bailey, Dean, Chicago College of Law, 1888–1896.
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and Stratton Business School Building. Kent’s first catalog opined that it
would be the first law school in the
country emphasizing the “practical
method,” requiring each student, after learning the basics of the law, to
“engage in the practical work such
as usually engages the attention of a
regular practitioner.” Such training
would enable graduates “at once to
fill important and responsible positions
. . . which, under the old method, they
could not . . . fill without from six
months to a year’s further training in
an office.” The curriculum featured
an upper class School of Practice, in
which each student would have to
draft all of the typical documents for
cases that would arise in every area
of practice.
Kent College was very successful, enrolling well over 500 students
during the first three years of its existence. Within a year, the law school
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Photo of 116 North Michigan Ave., site of Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1912–1924.

moved to the sixth floor of the Ashland Block Building at Clark and
Randolph. Two years later, it moved
again, this time to the Association
Building, next to the Chicago Bar
Association’s quarters on LaSalle
Street.
In 1902, Ewell’s advancing age
apparently led him to negotiate a
merger with Chicago College of Law
of Lake Forest University. The law
school name was changed to Chicago-Kent College of Law. Ewell and
some Kent faculty made the move as
well. Two years later, Lake Forest decided to leave the professional school
business, rescinded the merger, and
Chicago-Kent became a freestanding independent law school, which
it remained for 65 years. In subsequent years, Chicago-Kent absorbed
other law schools that had tried to
establish themselves in the Chicago

law school market, including colleges
named YMCA, Webster, Western and
Chicago Business Law. The Chicago-Kent curriculum was expanded to
three years, and a bachelor of laws
awarded to graduates, which made
them eligible for admission to the
bar. The law faculty adopted the Case
Method of teaching, pioneered by
Langdell of Harvard, but also retained
the senior School of Practice inherited
from Ewell and Kent College.
In 1904, Judge Thomas Moran
passed away. He was succeeded by
Justice Edmund W. Burke, also of
the Appellate Court. The law school
now employed, part-time, about 20
lawyers and judges to teach the solid
array of courses in its three-year curriculum. They were paid $5 per class
hour for their teaching. Courses were
divided by the number of weeks they
would meet. Thus, during their first
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year, students took Contracts for five
hours a week for 14 weeks, Torts for
two and one-half hours per week for
18 weeks, Personal Property for two
and one-half hours for 11 weeks, etc.
The law school moved again in
1913. It occupied three floors in the
new 116 N. Michigan Avenue Building, which also housed the Chicago
Municipal Courts. This arrangement made it easier to draw on the
judges and lawyers who served as
faculty, and reach out to the employers of many of the students. Among
the faculty was one distinguished
alumnus of the school, Hon. Henry
Horner, Judge of the Probate Court.
Horner continued to teach until
1924, during which time he wrote
the leading treatise on Illinois Probate Law. In 1933, he was elected
Governor of Illinois, serving till his
death in 1940.
The make-up of the student body
was incredibly diverse. A survey of
one class showed that the students
held jobs as disparate as accountants,
court reporters, dentists, engineers,
law clerks, letter carriers, merchants,
secretaries, teachers, etc. They were
primarily young people on the rise.
Thus, the school had a debating society, which placed teams in competitions against teams from other colleges. These debates were carried on
radio, and the listeners sent in their
ballots to choose the winners. The
school also had a swimming team, a
wrestling team, and a highly successful basketball team, all competing
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against teams sponsored by other local
colleges, churches, or clubs. One of the
six fraternities, Phi Alpha Delta, was
established at Chicago-Kent, and in
fact had its own fraternity house on
south Michigan Avenue. The first legal
sorority, Kappa Beta Pi, likewise began
at Chicago-Kent and soon had chapters throughout the country. A band,
the Kent Syncopators, was hired out
for weddings and bar mitzvahs. When
World War I broke out, many students
enlisted or were drafted. Some, unfortunately, did not return from the war.
B. World Wars I and II

I

n 1918, upon the death of Dean
Edmund W. Burke, his son, Webster Burke, became dean and president of the Board of Trustees. He
continued to run the school for over
30 years, at a salary of $400 per year.
He waived all salary during and after
World War II. Tuition in 1918, which
had been $60 per year in 1888, had
slowly risen to $90 per year. The early period of Webster Burke’s tenure
as dean saw the law school grow to
one of the largest in the country.
Thus, from 1909 to 1912, Chicago-Kent had the sixth largest student
population; from 1913 to 1916, it
had climbed to second largest.
Webster Burke was a frugal administrator and somehow raised
enough money so that by 1923 the
law school was able to finally buy
its own building, a small four-story
structure at 10 N. Franklin Street.
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That year coincided with the inauguration of the Chicago-Kent Law
Review.
Over the next 15 years, the law
school increased its requirements for
admission. The first change was to
require applicants to have completed at least 30 hours of college credit.
Within a few years, the requirement
grew to 60 hours. The school also
gradually moved towards adding a
day division. A major step was taken
in 1937 when the law school received
ABA accreditation, enabling graduates to be eligible to seek admission
to practice in any other state. In addition, part-time teachers were no
longer the entire law school faculty.
By 1940, six full-time teachers made
up the nucleus of the faculty: Donald Campbell, James Hemmingway,
Charles Pickett, Roger Severns, Ernest
Tupes and William F. Zacharias. Tuition now was charged by the credit
hour—$7 per hour, with 75 hours
required to graduate.
World War II had a serious impact on the law school. Unlike many
other law schools, it remained open,
though with very small classes. The
student-body was roughly a third of
its normal size. Warren Heindl, born
with cerebral palsy and thus ineligible for the draft, took one class in
which he was the only student. The
professor held every class and required Warren to “recite” on every
assigned case.
In 1949, Dean Burke resigned so
that the school could apply for AALS

accreditation. The rules required a
full-time dean and he still was working and drawing a salary at his old
law firm. Donald Campbell was promoted from the full-time faculty to
take on the job. AALS accreditation
was received in 1951, making Chicago-Kent one of only three non-university affiliated schools to be accredited by the AALS. The year 1951
also saw over 500 alumni attend the
65th annual homecoming luncheon
in the Grand Ballroom of the Sherman
Hotel. At that event, a Chicago-Kent
student team was honored for reaching the finals of the National Moot
Court Competition, a first for the
law school.
In 1956, Dean Campbell retired
and William F. Zacharias was chosen to succeed him. Zacharias at first
declined the offer because of what he
asserted was the deplorable physical
condition of the law school. The 10
N. Franklin building had no library.
Students had to use the library of the
Cook County Bar Association at the
Civic Center. It had only three classrooms and not enough offices for the
full-time faculty. In fact, Zacharias’
first faculty “office” was located in
the boiler room!
Zacharias agreed to accept the job
after President Douglas Schwantes
of the Board of Trustees announced
a fund-raising campaign, seeking to
acquire for the law school the adjoining wine warehouse at 12 N. Franklin, and to blend the two buildings
into one. A $500,000 campaign was

Ralph L. Brill

101
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successfully launched, the building
was acquired, and classes continued
to be held at 10 N. Franklin while the
blending construction took place at
12 N. Franklin. When it was complete, the law school now contained
space for a library reading room, a
reserve library stack area for 25,000
books, a 200-seat auditorium, six
classrooms, a student lounge, a small
faculty library, seven faculty offices,
a separate faculty washroom, a large
entry area, offices for the dean, registrar, and two assistants, as well as
space for a switchboard operator.
Dean Zacharias prided himself
on “running a tight ship.” However,
he often ran it too tightly. He was
dean, policeman, security guard,
registrar, admissions officer, and

secretary all-in-one. He made all
admissions decisions, some of them
controversial. He cut off the locks
from student lockers at the end of
the year. He physically removed
students from classes if they were
behind in paying tuition. He also
personally threw out the occasional
Skid Row bum who wandered into
the building. At the time of registration for a new semester, he wrote out
the class schedule for each student,
including selecting their “electives”
for them. When grades were turned
in, he computed each student’s grade
point average by pencil, and then
personally typed the warning letters
to those who were to be put on probation and the dismissal letters to
those who would be dismissed.
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Faculty who taught for most of
the Zacharias years included the
brilliant Fred Herzog, a judge in
Austria who fled the Nazi invasion
to come to America, James K. Marshall, Theodore Bayer, John Drac,
Marty Hauselman, Warren Heindl,
Shelvin Singer, Jerry Bepko, Dean
Sodaro, and a very young Ralph
Brill. Faculty salaries were very low,
and teaching loads were very high.
In 1968, both Dean Zacharias
and President Doug Schwantes announced that they would be retiring
within a year. While the school was
maintaining steady enrollment and
income, it had a very small endowment to fall back on should leaner
times appear. The Trustees continued to insist on quality education
at an affordable tuition—$18 per
credit hour with 75 hours required
for graduation. Some felt that the
reputation and the future of the
law school were jeopardized by the
fact that it was not connected with
a university. Thus an agreement was
reached to merge the school with
the Illinois Institute of Technology,
effective in 1969. A controversial
provision in the agreement indicated
that the law school would be moved
to the IIT campus in the future, away
from the downtown law firms and
not convenient for evening students.
The agreement also specified that
the Chicago-Kent name would not
be changed.
For the first time in its history,
the law school performed a nation-

wide search for Zacharias’ successor;
however in the end, the faculty and
administration chose Fred Herzog
to be its new leader. Simultaneously with his taking office in September 1970, an unexpected rise in applications for admission occurred.
The number of women taking the
LSAT rose dramatically. Within the
three years of his deanship, the total
enrollment of the school rose from
450 to 750, with most of the increase
being traceable to the high percentage of women entering law school.
The boom necessitated a dramatic
increase in full-time faculty, and
pushed the limits of the existing
physical plant to a nearly unmanageable level.
Dean Herzog made history by
the faculty he recruited and hired.
Among the many new faculty hired
during Dean Herzog’s short term
were Mary Lee Leahy, the first
woman professor at Chicago-Kent,
and Emerson Blue, the first African-American professor. Dr. Walter
Jaeger, a nationally famous professor at Georgetown and the author
of the revised edition of the famous
treatise, Williston on Contracts, was
induced to join the Chicago-Kent
faculty. He also hired Lew Collens,
who later would become dean of
the law school and then president
of the university. Two wonderful
colleagues, Howard Chapman and
Phil Hablutzel, were also hired at
that time and are still active and productive professors at the law school.
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When Professor Leahy left for a government appointment, Dean Herzog
hired another well-known female
lawyer, Jill McNulty, who later would
be elected as Justice of the Appellate
Court.
In December 1973, Dean Herzog
was recruited by the Illinois Attorney General to become First Assistant Attorney General of Illinois.
Professor Ralph Brill, then the associate dean, was elevated to interim
dean, and served for two years.
Much was accomplished in those
two years. The law school space was
doubled by annexing space at 33 W.
Madison. Five new professors were
hired, including David Rudstein and
Richard Conviser. A new clinical
program was started in which third
year law students earned credit by
working on Cook County Legal Assistance Foundation cases, under the
supervision of three clinical profes-

sors hired by the law school. Warren Wolfson, a well-known Chicago
lawyer and judge, was hired to start
the Trial Practice program.
C. The Lew Collens Era

I

n 1974, the IIT administration
selected Professor Lew Collens to
become the dean of the law school.
Lew went on to serve as dean for 17
years, at which time he was selected
to be the president of the university.
During Lew’s long reign as dean, the
law school made tremendous progress as an innovative and exciting
law school.
One of the first steps taken by
Dean Collens and IIT’s new president, Tom Martin, was to resolve the
physical plant issues that had mushroomed as the school had grown.
The 10–12 N. Franklin building was
much too small for the many stu-
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Photo of 77 South Wacker Dr., site of IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1976–1992.

dents and faculty now at the school,
and the 33 W. Madison annex was
only a temporary solution. While
the merger agreement with IIT had
specified that the law school would
relocate to a building on campus at
31st and Federal, the law school faculty, Chicago-Kent Board of Overseers, and the alumni agreed that
this would be a significant mistake.
President Martin agreed, and instead
raised funds to acquire a six-story building at 77 S. Wacker Drive.
The more than 120,000 square feet
was at least five times the total space
of the old building and annex. The
space was refurbished with modern
furniture and fixtures, several floors
of classrooms, two floors of open library stacks and reading rooms, over
50 faculty, administrative and student organization offices, a cafeteria,
one separate floor for the clinic, and

a multi-use auditorium. The library
grew to house 450,000 volumes. The
school moved into the new space in
mid-1976.
Dean Collens was a very pragmatic dean, willing to take chances with new ideas and back them
fully. Thus, in 1977, he approved
the creation and implementation
of the first three-year Legal Writing program in the country, headed
by Professor Brill. As it developed,
students were required to take 11
credit hours of the total of 90 now
required for graduation, in five separate courses, spread over three years
of law school. The program received
superlative reviews and the positive publicity was used successfully
as a recruiting tool by the admissions office. Full-time Legal Writing
teachers taught the first-year classes
and expert practitioners taught spe-
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cialized advanced courses. In later
years, a Visiting Assistant Professor
component was added to help cover
the first-year component. The VAP
program, basically an apprenticeship for new teachers, still receives
wide acclaim today. Over 50 former
VAPs have gone on to careers as law
professors at law schools throughout
the country.
The successful Legal Writing program also led to another remarkable
program. At the behest of students
Ron Petri and Tom Krebs, the faculty approved the creation of the Moot
Court Society. Students who had
excelled in the first-year second-semester Legal Writing oral advocacy
competition were invited into the
Society, and received credit for participation in an advanced intra-mural competition. From this competition, students were chosen to staff
Chicago-Kent teams in an increasing number of inter-mural national
moot court competitions. Almost
immediately, student teams began
winning local rounds of national
competitions and then advancing to
the final rounds of competitions such
as the very prestigious National Moot
Court Competition and the ABA
National Advocacy Competition.
Professor Ron Staudt was responsible for the next innovation the law
school could justly claim—the establishment in 1983 of the Center
for Law and Computers. Professor
Staudt received a grant from IBM
to install desktop computers into a
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student computer laboratory, and
to teach students how to create their
study materials, do legal research
and experiment with the creation
and drafting of legal documents using this then novel tool. Doctrinal
faculty, who at first were against the
use of the new gadgets, were taught
word processing and research, and
soon became supportive advocates
for the program.
The Legal Clinic, begun as a supplier of legal services for the poor,
was turned into a full fee-generating
law firm under the direction of Professor Gary Laser. The Chicago-Kent
Law Offices was and is still the only
law school clinic of its kind in American law schools. Clinic lawyers and
students worked on famous cases,
such as representing John Wayne
Gacy. One clinician, assisted by students, won acquittal on attempted
murder charges for Vietnam veteran Jerald Wood based on a Vietnam
stress syndrome defense. The Law
Offices also initiated an externship
program, placing students as law
clerks for credit with judges.
In the 1980s, the Trial Advocacy
program began sending teams to a
number of national competitions.
In 1988, a Chicago-Kent team, consisting of Lauretta Higgins, Peter
Roskam and Joel Daly, and coached
by Professor Warren Wolfson, won
the 13th Annual National Trial Advocacy competition, the start of a
marvelous string of victories in national competitions.
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Dean Collens also devoted much
attention to hiring and financially
supporting the best possible scholars to teach at Chicago-Kent. Thus,
within a few years of his decanal
appointment the following nationally recognized scholars joined the
faculty: Dan Tarlock, Mike Spak,
Sheldon Nahmod, Stuart Deutsch,
Howard Eglit, David Gerber, Marty
Malin, Jeffrey Sherman, Joan Steinman, Margaret Stewart, Richard
Wright, Steve Heyman, and Jacob
Corre. The law school also benefited
from semester or year-long visits by
distinguished professors from elite
law schools, including John Hart
Ely of Harvard, and Gerald Gunther
of Stanford. Special lectures were
delivered by celebrated dignitaries
including Justice Arthur Goldberg,
Judge Abner Mikva, Governor Adlai
Stevenson III, Mayor Harold Washington, and Mayor Richard J. Daley.
Financial support for Chicago-Kent
faculty scholarship was augmented
by a grant from Paul Freehling in
honor of his father, a Chicago-Kent
alumnus.
Wise decisions also were made in
judging young talent. Teachers who
were given their start at ChicagoKent, developed into leading experts
in their fields, and then moved on to
other schools included: Fred Abbott,
Randy Barnett, Dale Nance, Anita
Bernstein, Linda Hirshman, J. Gordon Hylton, and Carol Silver.
Another major change for the law
school was the establishment of a

number of specialized J.D. programs
and several graduate programs.
The graduate programs during this
period were in Tax Law, currently
run by Professor Gerry Brown, Financial Services, currently run by
Hank Perritt, and an LL.M. for foreign students, currently run as part
of our international programs under
the direction of Ed Harris. J.D. specialization certificate programs were
available to students in Environmental Law and Labor Law, later joined
by Litigation and Dispute Resolution
and Intellectual Property.
The successes of the school’s innovative skills programs led Chief
Justice Burger in 1986 to single out
Chicago-Kent for special praise. The
high quality of scholarship produced
by the faculty played a key role in
having Chicago-Kent inducted into
the prestigious Order of the Coif, the
70th school to receive that honor.
And, in 1990, U.S. News and World
Report listed Chicago-Kent as the
top “Up and Coming Law School in
the Country.”
In 1987, the law school celebrated
its 100th anniversary. The all-day
celebratory program featured visits by alumni and guests to the law
school, a convocation at McCormick Place, the bestowal of honorary Doctor of Laws degrees on Hon.
Harry Blackmun of the U.S. Supreme
Court and Professor Gerald Gunther
of Stanford. Speeches were given by
representatives of the students, faculty, alumni, legal education organi-
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zations, and IIT. Dean Collens listed
the agenda the school faced for the
next 100 years. The list included:
establishing faculty chairs to attract
and retain great faculty; establishing
interdisciplinary research centers
in such subjects as environmental
law, energy, computers and the law,
legal theory, and problems of the elderly; creating exchange programs
abroad to enhance the teaching of
international and comparative law;
expanding scholarship programs to
attract great students and ease their
financial burdens; and to expand the
physical plant to accommodate expected growth in students and faculty. All of these and more would be
accomplished in the next 25 years.
D. The Last 25 Years

T

he year 1990–91 was one of the
most important in the school’s
history. First, when IIT’s President
Meyer Feldberg suddenly resigned,
Lew Collens was elected by the IIT
Board of Trustees to fill that position.
He served as President until 2007.
Professor Joan Steinman served
as interim dean for one year. Rick
Matasar, the associate dean at Iowa,
was then selected to become Chicago-Kent’s next dean, the first Chicago-Kent dean to be chosen from outside the ranks of the existing faculty.
Second, the IIT Board of Trustees
seized an opportunity to sell the existing law school building at 77 S. Wacker
Drive and to raise additional funds
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with which to construct a new, stateof-the art building at 565 W. Adams
St., near Union Station. Among the
many innovations in the new building were the Abraham Lincoln Marovitz Courtroom, a 500-seat auditorium, full computer technology
in all offices and classrooms, a large
fresh food cafeteria, and multiple
student function areas. The building
was finished and occupied in 1992.
During the 1990–96 era the law
school faculty and dean focused on
trying to improve the school’s reputation among peer groups—i.e.,
scholarly faculty at other law schools.
Dean Matasar therefore created a
number of Distinguished Professorships, rewarding some of the faculty’s
most productive scholars. Many fine
scholars were added to the faculty,
including: Cheryl Harris, Lori Andrews, Katherine Baker, Fred Bosselman, Evelyn Brody, Bartram Brown,
James Lindgren, Richard McAdams,
Richard Warner, Harold Krent, Steve
Sowle, Richard Hasen, Rafael Gely
and Sarah Harding. The annual law
school catalog listed 12 pages of law
review articles and books for this
period.
Dean Matasar resigned in 1996
to become dean at the University of
Florida School of Law, and Professor
Stuart Deutsch filled in as interim
dean for a year. Professor Steve Sowle
took over as assistant dean from
long-time Associate Dean Howard
Chapman, who continues to teach
major courses in the curriculum.
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Professor Henry Perritt of Villanova was selected as dean of the
law school in 1997 and served until
2002. Perritt was a pioneer in the
use of computers in legal education,
wrote a multi-volume treatise on
labor law, and consulted on issues
related to the war and recovery in
Kosovo. As dean he established the
extensive multi-disciplinary Global
Law and Policy Initiative through
which faculty, students, and alumni
worked together on issues related to
international criminal law, assisting
the media to deal with political censorship in Bosnia, computerizing infrastructures for courts and business
in Poland, and providing advice to
refugees from the war in Kosovo.
Among the faculty hired during
Dean Perritt’s term were: Graeme
Dinwoodie, Steven Harris, Mark
Rosen, Claire Hill, Tim Holbrook,
Christopher Leslie, Nancy Marder,
and Peggie Smith.
By the end of Dean Perritt’s term
in 2002, Chicago-Kent was ranked
in the top third of all law schools
by U.S. News and World Report. It
was one of only a few schools with
an evening division to be ranked
that high. It ranked behind Chicago,
Northwestern and Illinois among
law schools in the state.
In 2003, Hal Krent was selected
to succeed Perritt as Chicago-Kent’s
dean. He still holds that position. It
is fair to say that since his appointment the law school has succeeded
in every major respect, from faculty

recruiting, to scholarly production,
to superior skills training, to having a major role in legislative and
societal planning. The quality of the
students has increased dramatically.
Members of the faculty are leaders in
their fields, invited to appear on nationwide programs as well as deliver
talks to individual law school audiences. They are regularly recruited
by more elite schools, but luckily most
have remained at Chicago-Kent. The
Moot Court and the Trial Advocacy
programs are consistently ranked
among the top 10 in the country.
The three-year Legal Writing program remains unique and emulated. The physical plant has been
continuously upgraded and is still
a state-of-the-art facility. The school
has added many international and
LL.M. programs, attracting over 100
students annually from all corners of
the globe.
The beginning years of the
twenty-first century continued the
wonderful successes of the Moot
Court program. Under the direction of Professor Sanford Greenberg
and, for the last nine years, Professor
Kent Streseman, the Chicago-Kent
Moot Court program has achieved
remarkable successes in national
competitions. Our teams have won
36 national and regional moot court
competitions, along with over 80 individual awards for brief-writing and
oral advocacy. It has the distinction
of being the only school nation-wide
to win back-to-back national titles in
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Photo by Hedrich Blessing Photography of 565 West Adams St., site of IIT ChicagoKent College of Law, 1992–present.

the National Moot Court Competition, the oldest and most prestigious
tournament in the country.
Similar successes have come in
the Trial Advocacy program. Under
the direction of former Judge Dave
Erickson, and with coaching assistance of many Chicago trial lawyers
and judges, the Chicago-Kent trial
teams and members have excelled in
national and regional competitions.
Since 2000, Chicago-Kent teams
have been National Champions four
times. In various regional competitions Judge Erickson’s teams have
been declared Champions nine times.
Under the direction of Mary Rose

Strubbe and Susan Adams, Chicago-Kent’s three-year Legal Writing
program continues to be a model
emulated by many other schools
and consistently ranks among the
top writing programs in the country.
The program has a group of very
experienced and dedicated teachers: Elizabeth De Armond, Suzanne
Ehrenberg, Doug Godfrey, Sanford
Greenberg, and Kari Johnson. Cherish Keller was hired recently to work
with teaching foreign students in the
LL.M. programs. Outstanding Visiting Assistant Professors fill out
the program before going on to
tenure-track teaching jobs at other
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law schools.
The Law Offices of Chicago-Kent
greatly expanded during the last 25
years. It now offers a wide range of
long-standing programs in live-client clinical legal education that accommodate more than 150 students
in the fall and spring semesters and
more than 50 students in the summer semester. The programs are
diverse, covering the practice of
criminal defense law, health and
disability law, immigration law, employment discrimination law, tax law,
family law, business law, and mediation and alternative dispute resolution. Current full-time teacher/
practitioners in the clinic are Gary
Laser, Richard Kling, Daniel Coyne,
Richard Gonzalez, Laurie Leader,
Heather Harper, Rhonda de Freitas,
Edward Kraus, Ana Mencini, Jonathan Decatorsmith, and Pam Kentra. Natalie Potts runs a program in
Open Government. Vivien Gross supervises the Judicial Externship and
Legal Externship programs in which
students are placed as law clerks for
credit with a judge or legal practice.
The last 10 years have seen the
greatest growth in the breadth and
credentials of the faculty. Dean
Krent raised one and a half million
dollars from 450 alumni to create
Chicago-Kent’s first endowed chair,
The Ralph L. Brill Chair in Law. Professor Adrian Walters, a world-renowned expert on bankruptcy law
from the United Kingdom, was appointed as the first chair-holder. The

school’s excellent reputation aided
the dean and faculty in recruiting
outstanding teachers including,
Sungjoon Cho, Carolyn Shapiro, Michael Scodro, Daniel Hamilton, Felice
Batlan, Bernadette Atuahene, William
Birdthistle, Kimberly Bailey, César
Rosado Marzán, Christopher Buccafusco, Edward Lee, David Schwartz,
Stephanie Stern and Christopher
Schmidt.
Chicago-Kent’s reputation for
constant innovation has continued
in the early twenty-first century. The
energy of the new faculty and of the
dean has led Chicago-Kent to become home to several institutes and
centers, with missions that range
from conducting scholarly and
practical research on legal and social issues to providing topical programming for the legal community
to developing public interest initiatives. Students who become involved
in these activities, many of which
involve cross-disciplinary projects,
learn to appreciate and adapt to
major social and global influences
changing the nature of legal practice.
II. The Future

I

hope that one reading this history is impressed with the tremendous growth of this great law school,
from the Evening Law Class meeting
in the chambers of Justice Bailey in
1887 to a vibrant, innovative, stateof-the-art educational institution.
Among the thousands of its gradu-
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ates are governors, senators, judges,
outstanding lawyers, corporate executives, teachers, and societal leaders.
The present situation is challenging. The economy has weakened the
demand for lawyers. The costs of
legal education have escalated dramatically. The innovations of the
past, while great, may not be enough
for the new issues law schools will
face in coming years. But throughout its history, this law school has
met every new challenge, including
the Great Depression and two World
Wars, by finding ways to innovate
and advance. The Spirits of the
founders, Justices Bailey and Moran,
and Marshall Ewell, and of their successors, hold great promise that this
law school will continue to thrive
and prepare great lawyers and public
leaders far into the future. ◆
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Ralph L. Brill has been a member of the
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law faculty
since 1961. He served as Associate Dean
from 1970 to 1973, and Acting Dean
from 1973 to 1974. For 14 years, Professor Brill was director of Chicago-Kent’s
unique three-year legal research and writing program, for which he is widely known.
He has been the recipient of numerous
awards for his contributions to the field
of Legal Writing, including the Burton
Foundation Legends Award, The AALS
Section on Legal Writing, the Reasoning
and Research Annual Award, the Legal
Writing Institute Lifetime Achievement
Award, the ALWD Leadership Award,
and the special LWI/ALWD Ralph L.
Brill Award for Long-Time service. Chicago-Kent’s first endowed chair is named
after him, and is held by Ralph L. Brill
Professor Adrian Walters. Professor Brill
is co-author (with S. Brody, C. Kunz, R.
Newmann and M. Walter) of the American Bar Association publication, A
Sourcebook on Legal Writing Programs,
has written numerous practical articles
on Tort law, and has prepared appellate
briefs in many important Tort cases.

